We focus on the effect of preference specifications on the current day valuation of future outcomes. Specifically, we analyze the effect of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution on the willingness to pay to avoid climate change risk. The first part of the paper analyzes a general disaster (jump) risk model with a constant arrival rate of disasters. This provides useful intuition in how preferences influence valuation of long-term risk. The second part of the paper extends this model with a climate model and a temperature dependent arrival rate. Since the model yields closed form solutions up to solving an integral, our model does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality of numerical IAMs with several state variables. Introducing Epstein-Zin preferences with an elasticity of substitution higher than one and ambiguity aversion leads to much larger estimates of the social cost of carbon than obtained under power utility. The dominant parameters are the risk aversion coefficient and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Ambiguity aversion is of second order importance. JEL codes: Q51, Q54, G12, G13 1 For a very different (and strongly worded) view focusing on the social welfare aspects of the rate of time preference rather than on individual preferences, see Chichilnisky, Hammond, and Stern (2018);Stern (2015) who look at a positive rate of time preference as discrimination between generations that happen to have been born at different moments in time.2 This list is not exhaustive, but is used to give an idea of the nature of an IAM. 3 The references do not contain the most recent versions of the IAMs.1. Power utility, no ambiguity aversion r 1 = r P ow − γλm − λ(e −γ(µ J − 1 2 γσ 2 J ) − 1) 2. SDU utility, no ambiguity aversion3. Power utility, ambiguity aversion r 3 = r SDU − γλ * m * − λ * (e −γ(µ J +b * σ 2 J − 1 2 γσ 2 J ) − 1) 4. SDU utility, ambiguity aversion r 4 = r