Dynamic incentive model of knowledge sharing in construction project team based on differential game

Lin, Lingna; Wang, He

doi:10.1080/01605682.2018.1516177

Cited by 27 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…In addition, differential games are also used in the study of KS problems. Lin and Wang (2019) used differential game theory to establish a dynamic incentive model to study the dynamic KS of construction project teams. Zhu et al (2017) considered random interference factors and established a stochastic differential game model to study the problem of KS in industry-university-research collaborative innovation.…”

Section: Differential Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Wang

Cao

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

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Section: Differential Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Wang

Cao

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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“…Keegan and Turner [36] found that TP is one of the key factors of the learning of project-based organizations through a survey of 19 European companies engaged in different industries. Based on the principal-agent theory, Lin and Wang [37] conducted a simulation analysis of multiagent project team knowledge sharing and pointed out that the knowledge sharing effort level of project team participants decreased with the passing of time. In other words, limited time leaves organizations with no systematic way to decide what actions to take or not to take.…”

Section: Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Mediating Role of Time Pressure on the Relationship between Organizational Psychology Safety and Motivation of Learning from Failure in Large‐Scale Construction Project

Lin

Luo

Cheng

et al. 2022

Advances in Civil Engineering

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Large-scale construction projects are characterized by the temporary cooperation of different parties with objectives, making it challenging to learn from failure under great time pressures. Learning from failure in such multiparties projects must overcome the fear of speaking out the “failure,” reflected by organizational psychology safety. This study aims to explore the impact of organizational psychology safety on the motivation of learning from failure under the mediating role of time pressure by a cross-sectional study. Data was collected by a questionnaire survey of 189 construction practitioners and analyzed by applying regression analysis. Results show that organizational psychology safety was negatively associated with time pressure and positively with the motivation of learning from failure. Time pressure was detrimental to the motivation of learning from failure, and it partially mediated the relationship between organizational psychology safety and motivation of learning from failure. Insights from the analysis could help the managers of organizations or projects to attach importance to the influence and role of learning from failure and could provide them with guides to implement lessons-learned systems.

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“…These studies have considered the benefit distribution of the alliance from a static perspective. Lin and Wang (2019) studied dynamic knowledge sharing, constructed a dynamic incentive model structure, and applied the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to solve Nash non-cooperative games and stochastic differential games by differential game theory.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit distribution of IPD projects using fuzzy alliance

Guo

Wang

2021

ECAM

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PurposeThis paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.Design/methodology/approachThis paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.FindingsA case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.Research limitations/implicationsThe theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.Practical implicationsBased on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.Social implicationsFor any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.Originality/valueThe contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

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Dynamic incentive model of knowledge sharing in construction project team based on differential game

Cited by 27 publications

References 38 publications

Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

Mediating Role of Time Pressure on the Relationship between Organizational Psychology Safety and Motivation of Learning from Failure in Large‐Scale Construction Project

Profit distribution of IPD projects using fuzzy alliance

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