Dynamic remodeling of in-group bias during the 2008 presidential election

Abstract

People often favor members of their own group, while discriminating against members of other groups. Such in-group favoritism has been shown to play an important role in human cooperation. However, in the face of changing conflicts and shifting alliances, it is essential for group identities to be flexible. Using the dictator game from behavioral economics, we demonstrate the remodeling of group identities among supporters of Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. After Clinton's concession in June 2008, Democrats were more generous toward supporters of their own preferred candidate than to supporters of the other Democratic candidate. The bias observed in June persisted into August, and disappeared only in early September after the Democratic National Convention. We also observe a strong gender effect, with bias both appearing and subsiding among men only. This experimental study illustrates a dynamic change in bias, tracking the realignment of real world conflict lines and public efforts to reconstitute group identity. The change in salient group identity we describe here likely contributed to the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.dictator game ͉ economic games ͉ evolution of cooperation ͉ Barack Obama ͉ gender differences

Currency value moderates equity preference among young children

“…For example, norms for appropriate behavior are strongly affected by the group membership of one's interaction partner among both children and adults, with people preferentially cooperating with in-group members (Fehr et al, 2008;Tajfel et al, 1971;Yamagishi et al, 1999). Moreover, norms governing the classification of others as ingroup versus out-group are dynamic and have been shown to change over time (Rand et al, 2009). The results of the present study demonstrate that a flexible approach to norms develops very early in life, and continues through childhood.…”

Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups

“…While this is advantageous in many ways, in some cases it might also facilitate the emergence of out-group discrimination. The conditions under which parochial altruism (in-group favouritism combined with out-group discrimination) emerged remain a topic of active scholarly debate [5,7,13,14].…”

“…People offer preferable treatment towards members of their own group and discriminate against those belonging to other groups [4][5][6][7][8][9][10]. Various explanations have been offered for in-group favouritism.…”

“…In-group favouritism, or solidarity, is a well-documented aspect of human behaviour [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]. People offer preferable treatment towards members of their own group and discriminate against those belonging to other groups [4][5][6][7][8][9][10].…”

Evolution of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures

“…Each individual engages in not only the "local" PGG in its community, but also the "global" PGG played among distinct communities. Hence, individuals are simultaneously involved in multiple PGGs on different hierarchical levels [17][18][19]. These simultaneous local and global PGGs in a community-structured population constitute a multilevel PGG (MPGG).…”