Dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computing: A randomized auction approach

Zhang, Linquan; Li, Zongpeng; Wu, Chuan

doi:10.1109/infocom.2014.6847966

Cited by 166 publications

(96 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Recently, some improved auction models have been widely used in the field of communication and networking, such as cooperative communication, CRNs, cloud computing, and crowdsensing. [13][14][15][16][17][18][19] In the application of cooperative communications, Yang et al 16 proposed a double auction-based incentive mechanism to encourage more wireless nodes to serve as relay nodes. Zhang et al proposed an online auction in IaaS clouds to maximize the social efficiency or the cloud provider's profit.…”

Section: Studies On Auction Theory For Wireless Communicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2016

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Spectrum resource is experiencing a rapid growth, which cannot meet the demand of the ever-increasing wireless communications technologies in recent years. Spectrum auctions in the secondary market have been considered as a prominent way to solve this challenge due to its fairness and effectiveness. However, most of the existing studies mainly focus on allocating spectrum in units of channels without considering allocate spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users, which has been supported by the software-defined radio technologies. Variable bandwidth trading can make the usage of spectrum more flexible and efficient. Thus, we study the spectrum auction problem where the primary user wants to share a continuous spectrum with the secondary users, and each secondary user has a fixed transmission demand. The target of this work is to design a truthful auction mechanism, which can allocate spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users and maximize the social efficiency at the same time. We first propose a bidmonotone winner determination mechanism to decide the winning secondary users in the auction. Since the optimal winner determination problem is NP-hard, we prove that the proposed mechanism has an approximation factor of 10. Then, a channel allocation mechanism is proposed, which can allocate spectrum to winners without interference. Finally, we compute the critical value for each winner to ensure truthfulness. We can demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism is truthful through theoretical analysis. We also perform extensive simulations to study the performance of the proposed auction mechanism, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.

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Section: Studies On Auction Theory For Wireless Communicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2016

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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“…Auctions belonging to this realm also appeared in markets formed by federations of clouds, for which two truthful double-auctions were specifically designed [18], [19]. Zhang et al [20] designed a randomized combinatorial auction by utilizing a pair of primal and dual linear programs, and pursue absolute truthfulness at the price of computational and economic efficiencies.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing

et al. 2014

2014 IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing

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Abstract-In a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding. These auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be tailored to maximize truthfulness.

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“…In a sequence of recent work that initiated from theoretical computer science [8,20,25,32], a polynomial-time convex decomposition technique is designed for converting fractional solution for an NP-hard problem, modelled as a linear integer program, into a weighted combination of integer solutions. Such a decomposition technique enables a randomized auction framework that automatically translates a centralized cooperative approximation algorithm into an auction mechanism, achieving the same social welfare approximation ratio as the plug-in approximation algorithm does, while guaranteeing truthful bidding.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids

ZhangLinquan

LiZongpeng

2014

SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev.

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This work studies electricity markets between power grids and microgrids, an emerging paradigm of electric power generation and supply. It is among the first that addresses the economic challenges arising from such grid integration, and represents the first power auction mechanism design that explicitly handles the Unit Commitment Problem (UCP), a key challenge in power grid optimization previously investigated only for centralized cooperative algorithms. The proposed solution leverages a recent result in theoretical computer science that can decompose an optimal fractional (infeasible) solution to NP-hard problems into a convex combination of integral (feasible) solutions. The end result includes randomized power auctions that are (approximately) truthful and computationally efficient, and achieve small approximation ratios for grid-wide social welfare under UCP constraints and temporal demand correlations. Both power markets with grid-to-microgrid and microgrid-to-grid energy sales are studied, with an auction designed for each, under the same randomized power auction framework. Trace driven simulations are conducted to verify the efficacy of the two proposed inter-grid power auctions.

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Dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computing: A randomized auction approach

Cited by 166 publications

References 20 publications

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing

Randomized auction design for electricity markets between grids and microgrids

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