Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods

Fershtman, Chaim; Nitzan, Shmuel

doi:10.1016/0014-2921(91)90004-3

Cited by 180 publications

(132 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…We believe that the lessons learned from this analysis extend to dynamic stock public good games in general (see e.g., Fershtman and Nitzan (1991)). Anticipating a future agreement that will increase the provision of a public good with a respect to a business-as-usual policy may result in an increase or a decrease of current contributions of the public good.…”

Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 82%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Anticipated International Environmental Agreements AbstractConsider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types of IEAs that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment. IEA type 1 sets a level of emissions, IEA type 2 and IEA type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis-à-vis the business-as-usual policy respectively. IEA type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories. We show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run, but the intended benefits of these IEAs can potentially be offset by the anticipatory noncooperative response of the signatories, leading to an environmental degradation in the short run. Which IEA is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation. When this target is above a certain threshold, welfare under IEA type 1 is larger than under IEA type 2 which is larger than under IEA type 3. Moreover, the highest level of welfare that can be attained under IEA type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three IEAs.JEL-Codes: Q530, Q540, Q580, Q590.

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Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 82%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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“…36), the sufficient conditions for optimality is satisfied on the plausible domain since it implies that k is absolutely continuous on [0, ∞) and U is continuously differentiable. 2 The sign of Z in Lemma 4.2 plays a crucial role in characterizing the dynamics of the economy, as will be clear in the statement in the last part of this section. Lemma 4.2 gives the dynamics of the economy as follows.…”

Section: Lemma 42 In a Symmetric Feedback Nash Equilibrium It Holdmentioning

confidence: 93%

Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities

Hori

Shibata

2009

J Optim Theory Appl

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Abstract. This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" or "running away from the Joneses".

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“…7 For example, see Admati and Perry (1991), Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Marx and Matthews (2000), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), Compte and Jehiel (2004), Pitchford and Snyder (2004), Matthews (2013), and Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014). Guéron (2015) considers a discrete-time infinite horizon model and obtains an equilibrium uniqueness result under an imperfect monitoring set-up.…”

Section: Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

Iijima

Kasahara

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study the implications of flexible adjustment in strategic interactions using a class of finite-horizon models in continuous time. Players take costly actions to affect the evolution of state variables that are commonly observable and perturbed by Brownian noise.The values of these state variables influence players' terminal payoffs at the deadline, as well as their flow payoffs. In contrast to the static case, the equilibrium is unique under a general class of terminal payoff functions. Our characterization of the equilibrium builds on recent developments in the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). We use this tool to analyze applications, including team production, hold-up problems, and dynamic contests. In a team production model, the unique equilibrium selects an efficient outcome when frictions vanish.

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Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods

Cited by 180 publications

References 13 publications

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities

Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness Under Noisy Monitoring

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