Dynamics analysis on competition between manufacturing and remanufacturing in context of government subsidies

Zhao, Liuwei; Chang, Jianwei; Du, Jianguo

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.01.034

Cited by 38 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Based on above analysis, we try to construct the pricing models. Here, according to the Stackelberg game [3,4,24,34,38], we consider the following four scenarios: manufacturer is the leader in supply chain and capital constrained (MS-MC), retailer is the leader in supply chain and manufacturer is capital constrained (RS-MC), manufacturer is the leader in supply chain and retailer is capital constrained (MS-RC), retailer is the leader in supply chain and capital constrained (RS-RC). Here, according to Stackelberg game, the leader in supply chain refers to supply chain member who has the prior right to make decision, for example, when the manufacturer is the leader in supply chain, the manufacturer can first decide his decision variable, and then the retailer decide her decision variable according to the optimal decision of the manufacturer.…”

Section: Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Cao¹,

Gong²,

You³

2021

JIMO

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In reality, supply chain member may apply for loan from bank when he\she is capital-constrained, or may deposit idle capital to bank when he\she is well-funded. This study focuses on the Stackelberg pricing policy considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain. First, the market demand is given, and then the profit functions of supply chain members are built. According to Stackelberg game, the four pricing models are constructed for four scenarios. By solving models, optimal pricing policies of supply chain members for each scenario can be determined. Finally, impacts of the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments, deposit rate and loan rate on optimal pricing policies are analyzed. The research results show that, in manufacturer capital-constrained situation, these rates can affect optimal pricing policies and profits; in retailer capital-constrained situation, deposit rate and loan rate have no effect on them, but the interest rate for fixed deposit by installments can still affect them. Our study provides a feasible way for supply chain members in pricing decision considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme in a dyadic capital-constrained supply chain, and contributes to the theoretical research on the capital-constrained supply chain management and the management practice for capital-constrained supply chain members with bank' deposit and loan.

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Section: Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Cao¹,

Gong²,

You³

2021

JIMO

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“…Zhang et al [48] confirmed that simple government subsidies or taxes on products upgrading with trade-in remanufacturing could induce a social optimum and optimal remanufacturing efficiency. Zhao et al [49] analyzed three different government subsidy scenarios, and their results showed that government subsidies for consumers had a significantly impact on the market competitiveness of remanufactured products. Xiao et al [50] examined the conditions for manufacturers and retailers to implement a trade-in policy voluntarily and then identified the optimal channel choice for implementing trade-in policies.…”

Section: Government Policy Of Closed-loop Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

et al. 2020

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Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

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“…From the numerical simulation, we can know that the adjustment speed has a great influence on the stability of the nonlinear dynamic system (12) [40][41][42]. e dynamic behavior of system (12) will be more complicated if the model parameters cannot be located to the desired stable region.…”

Section: Chaos Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Analysis and Chaos Control of Bertrand Triopoly Based on Differentiated Products and Heterogeneous Expectations

Zhao

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

Self Cite

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Price competition has become a universal commercial phenomenon nowadays. This paper considers a dynamic Bertrand price game model, in which enterprises have heterogeneous expectations. By the stability theory of the dynamic behavior of the Bertrand price game model, the instability of the boundary equilibrium point and the stability condition of the internal equilibrium point are obtained. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. Numerical analysis shows that the change of model parameters in a dynamic system has a significant impact on the stability of the system and can even lead to complex dynamic behaviors in the evolution of the entire economic system. This kind of complex dynamic behavior will cause certain damage to the stability of the whole economic system, causing the market to fall into a chaotic state, which is manifested as a kind of market disorder competition, which is very unfavorable to the stability of the economic system. Therefore, the chaotic behavior of the dynamical system is controlled by time-delay feedback control and the numerical analysis shows that the effective control of the dynamical system can be unstable behavior and the rapid recovery of the market can be stable and orderly.

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Dynamics analysis on competition between manufacturing and remanufacturing in context of government subsidies

Cited by 38 publications

References 17 publications

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Stackelberg pricing policy in dyadic capital-constrained supply chain considering bank's deposit and loan based on delay payment scheme

Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

Dynamic Analysis and Chaos Control of Bertrand Triopoly Based on Differentiated Products and Heterogeneous Expectations

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