Dynamics of a household norm in female labour supply

Vendrik, Maarten

doi:10.1016/s0165-1889(01)00073-2

Cited by 39 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Similar results can be obtained by assuming that women's work is, in part, a matter of social norm that can meet with dissonance and psychological costs (Vendrik, 2000).…”

supporting

confidence: 75%

Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power

Basu

2006

The Economic Journal

295

172

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The evidence that the same income can lead to different household decisions, depending on who the earner is, has led to an effort to replace the standard household model with the Ôcollective modelÕ, which recognises that a household's decisions depend on the power balance between the husband and the wife. This article recognises that the power balance can, in turn, depend on the decisions made. A new Ôhousehold equilibriumÕ and its dynamics are described and it is shown that there can be multiple equilibria in female labour-supply, and that child labour can decline and rise as the wife's power increases.The unitary model of the household, which had served mainstream economics well for a long time, has in recent times given way to a more fractious view of the household. This has been an outcome of theoretical advances, empirical investigations and anthropological insights.1 It is, for instance, clear that how much say a woman has in the household can vary across households in the same region and with the same total income; and this could depend, for example, on how much income she contributes to the household's total income. This recognition has enormous implications for the design of policy. It means that ÔhowÕ a certain amount of money is injected by government into households can influence the well-being of individuals significantly. Ten dollars given to the male head of the household and the same money given to his wife can have very different implications for not only the amount of tobacco and alcohol purchased by the household but on child labour, education and health (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994). When a series of policy changes in the United Kingdom -see Walker and Zhu (1999) for a description -from 1976 to 1979 caused the household allowance for children to be handed over to the women, instead of men, there was a rise in the expenditure on children's clothings (Lundberg et al., 1997); for related accounts, see Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999).2 However to go from this broad recognition to the actual design of policy one needs to understand the relation * The author is grateful to George Akerlof, Abhijit Banerjee, Chris Barrett, Alaka Basu, Francois Bourguignon, Nancy Chau, Amanda J. Felkey, Dragan Filipovich, Patrick Francois, Karla Hoff, Ravi Kanbur, Rachel Kranton, Valerie Lechene, Dilip Mookherjee, Omar Robles and Erik Thorbecke for useful discussions and to three anonymous referees for detailed comments and suggestions. The article has also benefited from seminar presentations at

show abstract

“…Similar results can be obtained by assuming that women's work is, in part, a matter of social norm that can meet with dissonance and psychological costs (Vendrik, 2000).…”

supporting

confidence: 75%

Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power

Basu

2006

The Economic Journal

295

172

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, our simple model offers diverse comparative static predictions that are testable.2 See e.g Akerlof (1980),Moffitt (1983),Besley and Coate (1992),. Bernheim (1994),Lindbeck et al (1999Lindbeck et al ( , 2003,Hart (2001),, andVendrick (2003) and the literature cited in these studies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social norms and economic incentives in firms

Huck¹,

Kübler²,

Weibull³

2012

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

107

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

a b s t r a c tThis paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise.

show abstract

“…His peers' working hours can be considered a reasonable proxy for what is expected. Vendrik (2003) develops a specific version of the theory of social custom for labour supply. Clark (2003) shows that unemployed men are happier if their peers are unemployed as well and interprets this as evidence that unemployment can constitute a social norm.…”

Section: Conformitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Conspicuous work: Peer working time, labour supply, and happiness

Collewet

Grip

Koning

2017

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:

show abstract

Dynamics of a household norm in female labour supply

Cited by 39 publications

References 18 publications

Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power

Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power

Social norms and economic incentives in firms

Conspicuous work: Peer working time, labour supply, and happiness

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About