E contrario arguments in law: From interpretation to implicit premisses

Kaptein, H.J.R.

doi:10.1007/bf01099839

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…Meyerson (1991), p. 132-136 for a game theory treatment of the winner's curse, and Bazerman & Samuelson (1983) for an application to hostile takeovers. 296 Cf. Athias & Nuñez (2008) for an interesting study of the concept in the context of tenders for toll roads.…”

Section: Cable Television In Oakland Californiamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transaction Costs of Semi-Public Institutions: Railway History as a Challenge for Coase

Holterman

2011

SSRN Journal

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Section: Cable Television In Oakland Californiamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transaction Costs of Semi-Public Institutions: Railway History as a Challenge for Coase

Holterman

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…First, a different or a further premise is necessary to draw the conclusion: a premise excluding other cases from the regulation stated by the legal sentence. In particular, if the conditional is intended as a material implication, the inference is an instance of the fallacy called "denying the antecedent" (cf., Henket 1992, Kaptein 1993, Jansen 2003a). To avoid the fallacy, one should point out that there are no other legal grounds on which the consequence should follow.…”

Section: Strong and Weak Pragmatic Negationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Contrary: Inferential Analysis and Ontological Assumptions of the A Contrario Argument

Canale

Tuzet

2008

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Abstract:We remark that the A Contrario Argument is an ambiguous technique of justification of judicial decisions. We distinguish two uses and versions of it, strong and weak, taking as example the normative sentence "Underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit". According to the strong version, only underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit, so stateless persons are not. According to the weak, the law does not regulate the position of underprivileged stateless persons in this respect. We propose an inferential analysis of the two uses along the lines of the scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom, and try to point out what are the ontological assumptions of the two. We conclude that the strong version is justified if and only if there is a relevant incompatibility between the regulated subject and the present case.Résumé: Nous faisons remarquer que l'argument a contrario est une technique ambiguë de justification de décisions judiciaires. Nous employons la phrase, « Les citoyens défavorisés sont permis de faire une demande d'aide gouvernementale », pour illustrer deux usages et deux versions de cet argument: fortes et faibles. Selon la version forte, seulement des citoyens défavorisés sont permis de faire une telle demande, donc des personnes qui ne sont pas citoyens n'y sont pas permises. Selon la version faible, la loi ne gère pas de cette façon les personnes défavorisées qui ne sont pas citoyens. Nous proposons une analyse inférentielle de ces deux usages qui est influencée par la pratique, décrite par Robert Brandon, de marquer des points dans les sports, et tentons d'exposer les suppositions ontologiques de ces deux usages. Nous concluons que la version forte est justifiée si et seulement s'il y a une incompatibilité pertinente entre le sujet gouverné et le cas présent.

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“…Again, as in the analogy argument, more or less complex reasoning appealing to underlying principle may be appealed to in order to determine this body of relevant law. In this important sense e contrario is not so much analogy's counterpart as well as relying as much on an (implicit) appeal to the system and the underlying principles as analogy does (see also Kaptein, 1993).…”

Section: Analogy and E Contrario (Problems) Killed Off By (Baby) Logimentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy and E Contrario

Kaptein

2005

Argumentation

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Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather different from traditional approaches appealing to standards of propositional logic. Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e contrario seem to disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation appears to be borne by often implicit general principles and an appeal to the system of the law as a whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best seen as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal argument.

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E contrario arguments in law: From interpretation to implicit premisses

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

The Transaction Costs of Semi-Public Institutions: Railway History as a Challenge for Coase

The Transaction Costs of Semi-Public Institutions: Railway History as a Challenge for Coase

On the Contrary: Inferential Analysis and Ontological Assumptions of the A Contrario Argument

Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy and E Contrario

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