2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.cjar.2015.02.001
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Earnings management, corporate governance and expense stickiness

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Cited by 73 publications
(83 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…They concluded that earnings management has a significant effect on expense stickiness. However, Xue and Hong (2015) found slightly similar evidence when they also conducted a study on earnings management, corporate governance, and sticky cost. They found evidence indicating the presence of sticky cost among the earnings management sub-sample but found a much more significant amount of sticky cost among the non-earnings management sub-sample.…”
Section: Sticky Cost and Real Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 76%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…They concluded that earnings management has a significant effect on expense stickiness. However, Xue and Hong (2015) found slightly similar evidence when they also conducted a study on earnings management, corporate governance, and sticky cost. They found evidence indicating the presence of sticky cost among the earnings management sub-sample but found a much more significant amount of sticky cost among the non-earnings management sub-sample.…”
Section: Sticky Cost and Real Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…Prior studies provide strong evidence. For instance, Xue and Hong (2015) found evidence indicating that both earnings management and sticky cost moves in the opposite direction, meaning as earnings management increases sticky cost diminishes. Consequently, the more a firm indulges in earnings management, the less sticky its cost will be.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Economic explanations for the mechanism between changes in activity and changes in cost have been put forward. The main arguments in prior research consider asymmetric optimal resource commitment decisions (Banker et al, , ) and agency conflicts (Anderson et al, ; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, ; Dierynck et al, ; Xue & Hong, ). From the agency perspective, self‐interested managers' empire‐building behavior leads to cost stickiness (Anderson et al, ; Chen et al, ).…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A governança corporativa é vista como um conjunto de mecanismos que pode contribuir de forma eficaz para atenuar o comportamento oportunista dos gestores, reduzir a assimetria de informações, ajudar a proteger os interesses dos diversos stakeholders e também melhorar a qualidade das informações divulgadas (Luthan et al, 2016;Xue & Hong, 2016). Nesse sentido, diversos pesquisadores, como, por exemplo, Shah, Zafar e Durrani (2009), Fathi (2013), Habbash et al (2014) e Chen, Cheng e Wang (2015, destacam que a governança corporativa tem seu foco principal na melhoria da qualidade dos relatórios financeiros, bem como sobre a criação de mecanismos eficazes no monitoramento da gestão.…”
Section: Governança Corporativaunclassified