eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace

Hasker, Kevin; Sickles, Robin C.

doi:10.1007/s11151-010-9257-5

Cited by 75 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 89 publications

(145 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…There was, however, a significant difference between the sellers' reputation. The sellers in the 11 Pure auctions and fixed-price auctions must end with the formats they start with, but BIN auctions can end with a bidder winning either with competitive bid or BIN. This is because once a bidder places a bid, BIN disappears and the auction becomes a pure auction.…”

Section: Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since eBay facilitates a fixed-price purchase with BIN in which the buyers are not allowed to place bids, what we call the "fixed-price" auction in this paper is called a BIN auction in some other papers (e.g., Hasker and Sickles, 2010). Also, although fixed-price format is not an auction per se, we call it a fixed-price "auction" for the sake of convenience in explanation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Seller's Listing Strategy in Online Auctions: Evidence from Ebay

Chen

Liu

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper empirically studies why the sellers of identical commodities adopt different auction formats in the online auction, and the consequences thereof. We postulate that the sellers adopt different auction formats because of the differences in their experience and the number of items they have. We first use these two characteristics to endogeneize the seller's choice between three auction formats: fixed-price, buy-it-now (BIN), and pure auctions. We then estimate the differences in sales rate, transaction price, and sale duration between the three formats. We find that the fixed-price auction results in the highest transaction price and the lowest sale rate, while the pure auction is just the opposite, with the BIN auction falling in between. These results strongly suggest that there is a tradeoff between price and sale probability in adopting different formats of auctions. * We thank Ching-I Huang and Jong-Rong Chen for their useful comments and suggestions.

show abstract

Section: Data Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Seller's Listing Strategy in Online Auctions: Evidence from Ebay

Chen

Liu

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…no price price dispersion). Hasker and Sickles (2010) use the incremental bidding prediction of the bidding rule in PS as a simple explanation for sniping in eBay. Zeithammer and Adams (2010) use data on eBay auctions to reject the hypothesis that these auctions resemble second-price sealed-bid auctions and use PS bidding rule as potential model consistent with some of their findings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS henceforth) characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in a competing auctions environment, where all buyers are linked to all the sellers. PS characterize a PBE using a simple bidding rule, whereby buyers select in which auction to bid.In this note we show that when buyers are linked with a subset of the sellers (i.e. when there are search frictions), the PS bidding rule is no longer guaranteed to be efficient nor a PBE of the competing auctions game of PS. Our results indicate that researchers should be cautious when using the PS bidding rule to make inference about the behavior of buyers and sellers in a market where frictions are present such as eBay.JEL Codes: C73; C78; D44.

show abstract

“…Some reviews of the empirical literature applied to this environment can be found in Ockenfels et al (2006) and Hasker and Sickles (2010). A more general review of previous literature regarding field experiments and empirical work on auctions is presented by LuckingReiley et al (2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price anchoring in Online Markets: an Empirical Assessment

Bogliacino¹,

Cuntz²

2013

RLP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is a large literature in behavioral economics contradicting the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once applied to auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due to the large use of auctions in mechanism design. One of the heuristics that may induce biased behavior is anchoring, namely the possibility that uninformative information influences choices. In this article we assess the impact of the anchoring effect in bidding for online auctions. Our aim is to isolate the anchoring effect of fixed price listing from the strategic bidding effect. Our empirical strategy is to use market segmentation induced by the presence of counterfeit products. Our results confirm the importance of behavioral heuristics and associate biases in auction. In particular we find price effects on auctions from upper and lower bounds(ceiling and floor) of the fixed price distribution and across run time. The results are robust with regard to various formulations of the baseline regression.Key words: auction; anchoring; counterfeit, heuristics. ResumenHay una amplia literatura que contradice las predicciones empíricas de la teoría de la elección racional aplicada a las subastas. El asunto es de mucha relevancia puesto que las subastas son muy utilizadas en el diseño de mecanismos. Uno de los heurísticos que puede introducir sesgos en los comportamientos es el anclaje, o sea la posibilidad que información irrelevante tenga influencia en la elección. En este artículo medimos el impacto del anclaje en las pujas de las subastas en línea. Nuestra estrategia empírica consiste en utilizar la segmentación del mercado inducida por la presencia de productos falsos. Nuestros resultados confirman la importancia de los heurísticos y los sesgos en las subastas. En particular, encontramos efectos de precios en las subastas desde los límites máximos y mínimos de las distribuciones de los precios fijos y a través del tiempo de ejecución. Los resultados son robustos a varias formulaciones de la regresión básica.Palabras clave: subastas, anclaje, falsificación, heurísticos.

show abstract

eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace

Cited by 75 publications

References 89 publications

The Seller's Listing Strategy in Online Auctions: Evidence from Ebay

The Seller's Listing Strategy in Online Auctions: Evidence from Ebay

Frictions in internet auctions with many traders: A counterexample

Price anchoring in Online Markets: an Empirical Assessment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About