Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations

Abstract

Most environments favor defection over cooperation due to natural selection. Nonetheless, the emergence of cooperation is omnipresent in many biological, social, and economic systems, quite contrary to the well-celebrated Darwinian theory of evolution. Much research has been devoted to better understanding how and why cooperation persists among self-interested individuals despite their competition for limited resources. Here we go beyond a single social dilemma since individuals usually encounter various social challenges. In particular, we propose and study a mathematical model incorporating both the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. We further extend this model by considering ecological signatures like mutation and selfless one-sided contribution of altruist free space. The nonlinear evolutionary dynamics that results from these upgrades offer a broader range of equilibrium outcomes, and it also often favors cooperation over defection. With the help of analytical and numerical calculations, our theoretical model sheds light on the mechanisms that maintain biodiversity, and it helps to explain the evolution of social order in human societies.

Eco-evolutionary cyclic dominance among predators, prey, and parasites

“…( 7) is a polynomial, it is continuous and locally Lipschitz. Thus, the solution of this proposed system (7)…”

“…Note that the overall initial densities must satisfy the constraint 0 ≤ p 0 + q 0 + r 0 ≤ 1 for a biologically meaningful interpretation. Furthermore from the eco-evolutionary model (7) with non-negative initial conditions (p 0 ≥ 0, q 0 ≥ 0, r 0 ≥ 0), we have…”

“…Any individual can use the free space for their well-being. Recently researchers brought this altruistic behavior of the free space to the limelight by investigating its impact on the evolution of cooperation [5,6,7]. Various simpler models with diverse motivations [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18] have been proposed to study the impact of free space on natural and human-made systems.…”

Eco-evolutionary games for harvesting self-renewing common resource: effect of growing harvester population

“…To this end, recently [24,25] the formalism of evolutionary game theory [26][27][28][29] and the deterministic replicator dynamics [30][31][32][33] have proven to be very insightful in studying the dynamics of the aforementioned feedback. Furthermore, feedback of the extrinsic goods incessantly changes the underline dilemma and could be explicated as if the individuals face multigame [34,35] strategic interaction. However, the motivation behind all the governing equations therein is rather phenomenological.…”

The dynamics of a duopoly Stackelberg game with marginal costs among heterogeneous players

“…Strategic behaviors are essential in interactions such as the competition in economic enterprises, multilateral bargaining, and auctions [16,17]. Nevertheless, since the logic of game theory remains invariant concerning the change in different modes of science, the applications of the game theory can be extended and illustrated metaphorically to portrait situations over several other fields of science [18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25].…”