Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation

Lee, Sang‐Ho; Park, Chul‐Hi

doi:10.1515/bejte-2017-0043

Cited by 33 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Section 5 concludes the paper. 6 It is also well-documented in recent literature that strategic CSR initiatives can increase a firm's profitability (see, e.g., Lambertini and Tampieri, 2015;Liu et al, 2015;Hirose et al, 2017;Leal et al, 2018;Xu and Lee, 2018;Lee and Park, 2019;Garcia et al, 2019). 7 The promotion of CSR has become a top priority in policy agenda in many developed countries such as the United States and in the European Union.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Cho

Lee

Hoang

2019

Australian Economic Papers

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This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyzes strategic trade policy toward a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous-timing game, we show that a simultaneous-move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviors between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Recent studies show that strategic CSR initiatives can increase a firm's profitability (see, e.g.,Lambertini and Tampieri, 2015;Liu et al, 2015;Hirose et al, 2017;Leal et al, 2018;Xu and Lee, 2018;Lee and Park, 2019;Garcia et al, 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Cho

Lee

Hoang

2019

Australian Economic Papers

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“…However, they confined into the symmetric market configuration of oligopoly competition and revealed that all firms adopt a positive CSR level in the market equilibrium. Hirose et al (2020Hirose et al ( , 2017 and Lee and Park (2019) investigated the strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) of polluting firms and showed that firms will adopt ECSR simultaneously or sequentially to mitigate price competition and earn higher profits. In their analysis, however, the economic role of some critical parameters such as product differentiation, economies of scale, multiproduct firms are limited.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive CSR in a strategic managerial delegation game with a multiproduct corporation

2021

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We study the firm's strategic choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a managerial delegation framework where a multiproduct corporation competes against a single plant firm. We examine simultaneousmove versus sequential-move in output choices when CSR decisions are simultaneous. We show that both firms adopt CSR in a simultaneous-move game, whereas only the follower firm adopts CSR (but not the leader firm) in sequential-move games. We also consider an endogenous timing game in output choices between the two firms and show that a simultaneous-move is an equilibrium when the products are substitutes or weak complements, while a single plant firm's leadership is an equilibrium when the products are sufficiently strong complements. Our findings can explain the widely observed phenomenon, in the real world, of different industries in which firms' CSR activities are more or less (even non-CSR or negative CSR) commonly widespread. It also partially helps us understand CSR's strategic motives and its relations with the firm's profits.

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“…In recent years, more and more researchers also have paid much attention to CSR and CER [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Qin et al [7] constructed a CER conceptual framework for researchers and proposed a conceptual model for policymakers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility

Peng

Xin

Kwon

2019

IJERPH

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With the awakening of environmental consciousness, more and more firms desire to go “green” by shifting their focus of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from charitable contributions to environmental actions called corporate environmental responsibility (CER). We develop a monopoly differential game to depict optimal corporate strategies of product price, quality, and CER. Using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation, we analyze optimal feedback equilibrium strategies for pricing and investing in both quality and CER with/without government subsidies. Numerical simulations show that government subsidy can improve CER and profit.

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Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation

Cited by 33 publications

References 15 publications

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Competitive CSR in a strategic managerial delegation game with a multiproduct corporation

Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility

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