2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2004.06.002
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Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices

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Cited by 43 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…If you want to build the model, you should first ensure the value p in Eq.3. Every variable has the same value p which can be got by statistics-( ) AIC p and ( ) BIC p [10]: reach their minimums at the same time, the p can be ensured [11] . The choice of explanatory variables.…”
Section: Adl Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If you want to build the model, you should first ensure the value p in Eq.3. Every variable has the same value p which can be got by statistics-( ) AIC p and ( ) BIC p [10]: reach their minimums at the same time, the p can be ensured [11] . The choice of explanatory variables.…”
Section: Adl Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See, for example, Guerre et al (2000Guerre et al ( , 2009 and Li and Liu (2022) for such identification results; and Liu and Vuong (2021) and Liu and Luo (2017) for testing the restrictions of exogenous participation and monotone strategies in auctions. 2 Under selective entry, Li (2005) introduced a method of simulated moments estimator to estimate the value distribution parametrically using the known bids and number of bidders. Marmer et al (2013) proposed a general framework of the AS model to characterize selective entry in auctions and designed a nonparametric test to discriminate its two polar cases given by Levin and Smith (1994) and Samuelson (1985), respectively, from the general model.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%