Economic calculations, instability and (in)formalisation of the state in Mauritania, 2003–2011

Abstract

This article describes the transformations of the state in Mauritania in 2003-2011 in terms of the concrete practices of economic policy management. It questions the relationship to the state in a context of massive informality and where circumvention of the rules and misappropriation are major political repertoires. Nevertheless, my observations suggest that it is useful to study the rules and formal procedures in concrete terms in order to decode the way that they structure power relations in Mauritania, and that this analysis can be used to investigate the transformations of the state. I propose a reinterpretation of Mauritania's political trajectory seen through the prism of the concrete practices of economic management. This reveals that, despite major deception in relation to macroeconomic figures revealed in 2005, technocratic activity continued in an "ocean of transgression". RÉSUMÉ Cet article rend compte des transformations de l'Etat en Mauritanie entre 2003 et 2011 par le biais des pratiques concrètes de la gestion des politiques économiques. Il questionne le rapport à l'Etat dans un contexte où l'informalité est massive et où le contournement des règles et l'arnaque sont des répertoires politiques majeurs. Néanmoins, mon constat indique qu'il est intéressant de décrypter la manière dont les règles et procédures formelles, étudiées au concret, structurent les rapports de pouvoir en Mauritanie, et que cette analyse peut servir à interroger les transformations de l'Etat. Je propose une relecture de la trajectoire politique nationale au prisme des pratiques concrètes de gestion de l'économie. Il en ressort que, même lors des importants mensonges sur les chiffres macroéconomiques, dévoilés en 2005, l'action technocratique a pu se maintenir dans un « océan de transgression ».

Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Domestic Consequences of International Efforts to Build Institutions

“…However, another group of scholars are much less sanguine about external incentives and pressures. They warn that these can result in unproductive or pathological behaviors, such as insincere compliance, strategic manipulation or withholding of information, and the creation of "rational fictions" for external consumption (McNamara 2002;Bush 2011;Simpser and Donno 2012;Samuel 2014;Kerner, Jerven, and Beatty Forthcoming;Sandefur and Glassman 2015). We provide new evidence about one mechanism (target-setting) through which international actors set in motion incentives for governments to engage in unproductive signaling.…”

“…Samuel (2014) notes that, on paper, the Government of Mauritania was a "model pupil" that embraced advice on institutional reform and assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions.…”

“…1 The local authorities standardized and streamlined value-added tax 1 Samuel (2014, 79), who draws heavily upon his firsthand experiences and observations 7 rates and exemptions, revised public procurement and investment regulations, created a monitoring system for poverty-related expenditure, and adopted the global best practice of a However, beneath this "reformist façade" was a situation of widespread institutional dysfunction and disorder, including the existence of an illegal yet openly functioning currency market, the large-scale raiding of public coffers, and the systematic falsification of macroeconomic data (Samuel 2014 (Girod and Walters 2012, 186). A 2012 Freedom House report also documents the superficial nature of the governance and anti-corruption reforms that were undertaken: "In April 2007, … the government adopted a code of ethics for public officials.…”

“…External sponsors are complicit in this problem (Andrews 2013;Pritchett et al 2013;Samuel 2014). They not only enable and encourage their counterparts in developing countries to pursue de jure institutional development activities and targets, but also use the same shallow targets to demonstrate success to their member states or legislatures.…”

On the accuracy of trade and GDP statistics in Africa: Errors of commission and omission

“…Alternatively, Ellis (2009) highlights Guinea-Bissau as a country that has been infiltrated by drug interests. 8 SeeSamuel (2014) for the contemporary case of Mauritania.…”