Economic governance, dual networks and innovative learning in five Chinese industrial clusters

Jiang, Wei; Zhou, Minfei; Greeven, Mark J.; Qu, Hongyan May

doi:10.1007/s10490-016-9470-3

Cited by 19 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 104 publications

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“…They consist of competitors, suppliers, consumers, peripheral industries, local governments, and universities that participate in industry value chains. Most of the member enterprises in the cluster choose to participate and are aware of their mutual interdependencies [3,13,14]. In such a cluster, the families, friends, and relatives work together in the same geographical area, and because they are acquainted with each other, as compared to other innovative cooperation between ordinary enterprises, the cluster enterprises innovative cooperation will exhibit less opportunistic behavior and benefit from better cooperative behavior [15,16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such a cluster, the families, friends, and relatives work together in the same geographical area, and because they are acquainted with each other, as compared to other innovative cooperation between ordinary enterprises, the cluster enterprises innovative cooperation will exhibit less opportunistic behavior and benefit from better cooperative behavior [15,16]. Furthermore, the cluster regulations may include formal ones, such as rules issued and implemented by local governments on clusters, and also informal ones, such as behavioral norms, industry rules, and cultural cultivation embedded in the cognitions of cluster enterprise to reduce the opportunistic behavior and promote the integrity of cooperation between enterprises in the cluster [14]. The informal contract refers to the governance mechanism by which informal norms formed over the years in the region influence the economic interactions between cluster firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of effective government implementation, transaction costs between firms can be reduced, and cooperation between firms in the same cluster is promoted through nonmarket coordination. Both informal and formal contracts are ways to reduce opportunistic behavior in the transactional relationship [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Han

Chen

Poh

2018

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Han

Chen

Poh

2018

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…Latecomer firms also take advantage of knowledge spillover from OEM customer firms in terms of R&D activities, such that latecomers have the opportunity to move beyond OEM and develop original design manufacturing (ODM), for instance, by engaging in product upgrading . Third, enterprises embedded in technological clusters can effectively absorb local knowledge through local networks, thus acquiring a unique ability to localize (Wei et al 2016g). In a transitional economy, latecomer firms embedded in such clusters face a dilemma: While local innovation networks promote knowledge spillover through collective learning, geographical and cognitive proximity can also lead to a local lock-in effect, which leads to the decline of the cluster.…”

Section: Knowledge Sources For Frugal Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are many small and medium enterprises which are component contractors for larger firms, and a large amount of specialized intermediaries also facilitate the learning process of these firms. Consequently, mass manufacturing with standardized technology can be achieved in these technological clusters (Wei et al 2016g). In conclusion, the uniqueness of China's market, and institutional and technological contexts fundamentally influences Chinese firms' technological catching-up process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an asymmetry-based view of Chinese firms’ technological catch-up

Jiang

Wang

Liu

2018

Front. Bus. Res. China

Self Cite

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By carefully reviewing our research and related literature, in this paper, we propose a two-stage model of Chinese firms' technological catch-up, and provide asymmetrybased explanations. We argue that at the approaching stage, Chinese firms mainly focus on knowledge accumulation through frugal innovation for capturing local and global low-end markets; while at the pole vault stage, they focus on knowledge creation through radical innovation for capturing the high-end market. Moreover, we propose that lacking world-leading technologies but striving to achieve technological catch-up quickly, Chinese firms mainly rely on asymmetric resource and capabilities that are embedded within Chinese institutional, technological and market contexts. Turning these asymmetries into sustainable capabilities and then matching them to market opportunities by developing asymmetric innovation strategies, Chinese firms could achieve technological catch-up in a unique way.

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Dynamics and Factors of Innovation Gap Between the European Union and China

Kowalski

2020

J Knowl Econ

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The article focuses on the problem of innovation gap in the world economy, as there are in general countries with developed national innovation systems, playing the role of technology leaders, and those with developing innovation systems, acting as innovation followers. Western European economies belong usually to the first group whereas China is traditionally classified in the second group; however, the analysis conducted in this study reveals a continuous catch-up process of this country towards the European Union in terms of the level of innovativeness of the economy. The purpose of this paper is to measure the dynamics of innovation gap between China and the EU average, and to identify the determinants of its evolution. Although for most of the analyzed indicators related to innovation, China’s performance is much below the EU average, the growth rates for Chinese economy in 2008–2018 have been higher than these of the EU, indicating convergence process. The key to development success in China lies in closing the technological gap by importing existing technology, and strengthening internal capabilities to utilize and improve on those technologies. Different reasons for China’s economy improvement in terms of innovativeness are analyzed, including external factors (e.g., foreign direct investments, which are concentrated mostly in eastern provinces, and associated technology transfer) and internal aspects (like science, technology and innovation policy, investment in research and development, and emergence of innovative regional clusters). The conclusion is that dynamic processes of increasing innovative potential of China provide with a solid fundamental for further convergence and diminishing innovation gap between this country and the European Union.

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Economic governance, dual networks and innovative learning in five Chinese industrial clusters

Cited by 19 publications

References 104 publications

Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Towards an asymmetry-based view of Chinese firms’ technological catch-up

Dynamics and Factors of Innovation Gap Between the European Union and China

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