Economic Insecurity, the Social Market Economy, and Support for the German Left

Bowyer, Benjamin; Vail, Mark I.

doi:10.1080/01402382.2011.572387

Cited by 32 publications

(35 citation statements)

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“…Income positively impacts the probability to vote for center and right-wing candidates (a one point deviation in income increases by half a point the risk to vote for Sarkozy or Bayrou rather than for Mélenchon), in line with previous research (Cautrès, 2003 and the gentrification of the left electorate over the past decades . The most striking finding however is that, contrary to available comparative evidence (Visser et al, 2014) and the German case (Bowyer and Vail, 2011), our results do not point at a homogeneous low-income profile. In line with existing research, voters with high income are more likely to vote for the right and centrist candidates, but this dimension does not play a role in choosing FDG over other parties.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…First, our results only partly confirm previous analyzes that found a link on economic hardship and far-left voting. For example, in contrast with their German (Bowyer and Vail, 2011) and Greek counterparts (Bedock and Vasilopoulos, 2015), the French far left does not attract more votes among those who have been hurt by the crisis the most, such as manual workers or the unemployed, but its electoral support rather cuts across these segments. Our results show that, in the case of France, economic hardship appears to be only one of several dimensions of the far-left vote.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…However, research about the impact of economic evaluations on far-left parties remains scarce. In two recent studies that investigate the relation between far-left voting and economic conditions, Bowyer and Vail (2011) show negative sociotropic evaluations positively impact the probability to vote for the German far left party, Die Linke whereas Bedock and Vasilopoulos highlight an association between the loss of income and the propensity to vote for the Greek far-left party Syriza (2015). More recently, two additional studies further illustrated an association between other indexes of economic hardship and far and radical left voting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A red letter day: Investigating the renaissance of the French far left in the 2012 presidential election

2015

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This article extends the current literature on European far-left parties by investigating the sociodemographic, ideological and attitudinal profile of the French far-left voter in the 2012 Presidential Elections. Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of the economic crisis on the sudden electoral rise of the French far left and factors such as economic hardship, change of economic conditions, attitudes toward economic inequality and Euroscepticism. Results suggest that explanations based purely on economic factors fall short of explaining the totality of the French far-left vote, especially if compared with the other parties of the French far left. Instead, attitudes toward Europe and post-materialism are central in the understanding of the renaissance of the French far left. On the basis of these findings we reach a number of conclusions regarding the future of far-left parties in France and Europe.

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Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A red letter day: Investigating the renaissance of the French far left in the 2012 presidential election

2015

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“…Thus, given that the radical left is more inclined to support redistribution and income equality (e.g. Bowyer and Vail 2011;Inglehart and Norris 2003;March and Rommerskirchen 2015), we may even expect more women to support radical left parties. In other words, if our notion of gendered populist attitudes holds, the gender dynamics in voting for the populist radical left would counter the normal trend for women to be more supportive of left-wing parties.…”

Section: Populist Attitudes and The Gender Gapmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Spierings

Zaslove

2017

West European Politics

137

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Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity -gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants -cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics -populist attitudesthat explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right. KEYWORDS populism; gender gap; voting behaviour; populist radical right; left-wing populism; europeThe electoral success of populist parties does not seem to subside. In fact, it appears that the opposite is true: in addition to the continuing success of populist radical right parties (PRR), in recent years, there has also been a surge in populist (radical) left parties. Recent examples include Podemos in Spain, SYRIZA in Greece, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, 1 the Dutch Socialistische Partij, and Die Linke in Germany. The continued, and perhaps even growing, success of populist parties presents us with an interesting question: why do voters continue to support populist parties?CONTACT niels spierings n.spierings@maw.ru.nl OPEN ACCESS 822 N. SPIERINGS AND A. ZASLOVEResearch in the last 10 to 15 years has provided answers to this question. Reasons for the support for the populist radical right are found in opposition to immigration (e.g. Immerzeel 2015;Lubbers et al. 2002;Norris 2005;Spierings and Zaslove 2015b), lower levels of trust in political institutions (Norris 2005) and being less well educated, younger, and male (Harteveld et al. 2015;Immerzeel 2015;Spierings and Zaslove 2015b). In contrast, supporters of the populist radical left are marginally more supportive of economic equality than supporters of other parties (Visser et al. 2014). The socio-economic profile of (populist) radical left parties is, however, less clear. Visser et al. (2014) show that those with lower incomes and those who are unemployed are more likely to possess a radical left ideology. Ramiro (2016) finds that those who identify with the working class are more likely to support radical left parties. Education is, however, more complicated: both less well and more highly educated voters are attracted to the radical left (Ramiro 2016). Nevertheless, there is a quality that the populist radical right and populist left parties have in common: their populist attitudes .Despite our growing knowledge of why voters support the ...

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“…2 Specifically, most works written about RLPs are single-case studies (e.g. Bowyer and Vail, 2011;Hough et al, 2007;Sperber, 2010;Vail, 2009); most comparative studies focus on discrete elements of RLP activity such as attitudes to Europe or government participation (e.g. Dunphy, 2004;Olsen et al, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties

2012

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European radical left parties (RLPs) are gradually receiving greater attention. Yet, to date, what has received insufficient focus is why such parties have maintained residues of electoral support after the collapse of the USSR and why this support varies so widely. This article is the first to subject RLPs to large-n quantitative analysis, focusing on 39 parties in 34 European countries from 1990 to 2008. It uses the 'supply and demand' conceptual framework developed for radical right parties to identify a number of socio-economic, political-cultural and party-system variables in the external environment that might potentially affect RLP support. The article finds the most persuasive variables to include political culture (past party success), the level of unemployment, Euroscepticism and antiglobalization sentiment, the electoral threshold and competition from Green and radical right parties. The findings suggest several avenues for future research and provide a framework that can be adapted to explain the electoral success of other party families.

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Economic Insecurity, the Social Market Economy, and Support for the German Left

Cited by 32 publications

References 10 publications

A red letter day: Investigating the renaissance of the French far left in the 2012 presidential election

A red letter day: Investigating the renaissance of the French far left in the 2012 presidential election

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties

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