“…These articles contribute to a growing literature on the dynamics of approval in presidential systems (e.g., Arce and Carrión, 2010;Carlin, Carreras and Love, forthcoming;Cuzán and Bundrick, 1997;Carlin, Hartlyn and Martínez-Gallardo, 2012;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009;Pérez-Liñán, 2007) by highlighting a set of factors that explain why some presidents deviate from the typical cyclical pattern. In line with previous research on economic voting in Latin America (e.g., Boelhouwer Menezes, 2018;Benton, 2005;Cabezas, 2015;Cabezas and Navia, 2010;Echegaray, 2005;Gélineau, 2007;Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009;Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013;Love and Windsor, 2018;Luna, 2002;Menezes, 2018;Murillo and Visconti, 2017;Singer, 2013Singer, , 2015Singer and Carlin, 2013;Visconti, 2017), all of the authors in this special issue agree that economic outputs -and economic perceptions of performance-go a long way in explaining patterns of executive approval. Also in line with previous work (Powell and Whitten, 1993), some of the articles find that institutions can alter patterns of approval.…”