Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis

Desmembramento de municípios: impactos sobre as eleições legislativas municipais

“…Partimos da ideia de que a divisão do município, e consequente mudança do distrito eleitoral, impactam os resultados das eleições. Como observamos mudança no curto prazo, em que as posições ideológicas estão fixas, assumimos que o voto é retrospectivo (Fiorina, 1981). Em diversos modelos que pressupõem retrospecção do eleitor, as variáveis utilizadas como indicadoras do sucesso do governo anterior são econômicas de maior abrangência, tal como variação no PIB e geração de empregos (Simas, Turgeon e Pedro, 2016, p. 125).…”

Voter Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model

“…Therefore, we formally include development aid in C k , although we are aware that campaign spending by national interest groups and development aid are fundamentally different in many other respects. A third set of indicators corresponds to the concept of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981;Katz and Katz 2009) (i.e., voters use observable welfare indicators Z r v , such as income growth or other well-being indicators realized in the incumbent's last election period, to update their evaluation of the incumbent's competence and popularity). From the viewpoint of the incumbent party, the welfare indicator is determined by implemented policies, Z r v ¼ z vr γ ð Þ.…”

“…On the other hand inspired by the Michigan School (Campbell et al 1960) as well as the ColumbiaSchool (Lazarsfeld et al 1968) nowadays a large body of empirical voter studies exists that analyzes the relative importance of different voting motives for specific voter groups, e.g. policy-oriented voting (e.g., Downs 1957a, b;Enelow and Hinich 1984), non-policy oriented voting (Miller and Shanks 1996), as well as retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981). However, these empirical voter studies do not yet relate identified difference in voter behavior with induced governmental performance.…”

Multi-Level Elections in Switzerland

“…Shared or consociational government as practiced in Switzerland, however, probably compromises voters' ability to use their vote to sanction the national government (Powell and Whitten 1993), and weakens the signal that political and economic conditions provide about the competence of the incumbent parties (Duch and Stevenson 2005). In line with this, Schloeth (1998) has not found any evidence of ''retrospective voting'' (Fiorina 1981) in Swiss national parliamentary elections, and there are no obvious grounds to expect it to occur at the lower federal levels either.…”