Editorial

Salomon, G.

doi:10.1016/0043-1648(63)90278-3

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“…Brisson continues: "In the Euthydemus (272e) and in the Phaedrus (242d), it stops him from getting up and leaving." 111 This makes the sign sound rather ridiculous. Why would it simply stop Socrates from getting up and leaving?…”

Section: Socrates' 'Daimonion'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Weiss, the passage has a moralreligious meaning, and she considers it to offer "still stronger support for my thesis that the daimonion does not oppose Socrates' views but warns him when he is about to oppose them." The reason for this is that the Phaedrus tells us what happened before the appearance of the 'daimonion', and hence 111 Idem. 112 Weiss (2005), 89.…”

Section: Socrates' 'Daimonion'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…II, § 1). 44 And he uses similar expressions in his early work; see Yolton (1993), lemma 'innate ideas' (110)(111). 45 Idem.…”

Section: 32mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Bergson says: "it is impossible to travel back to an intuition one has not had", so this is not what I should aim for. 111 The analysis is not meant to evoke the experiences that engendered the analysed symbols. But I am also not satisfied with the kind of analysis Bergson describes, the kind that immobilizes and solidifies reality -the kind that falls prey to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, as Whitehead famously called it.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…111 Though they were not completely consistent in their rejection of the term 'conscience', they virtually discarded it -in Locke's case in his later writings. It is remarkable that in Locke's work on education the word 'conscience' does not occur even once.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Conscience and Conscientious Objections

Schinkel¹

2007

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Conscience and Conscientious ObjectionsThe publication of this book is made possible by grants from the Blaise Pascal Instituut, the Vrije Universiteit, and the department of Philosophy of the Vrije Universiteit. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book. 'No, not as people used to think that God existed.' All one can do is to appeal to certain areas of experience, pointing out certain features, and using suitable metaphors and inventing suitable concepts where necessary to make these features visible." IRIS MURDOCH, "On God and Good" "[I]t seems to me impossible to discuss certain kinds of concept without resort to metaphor, since the concepts are themselves deeply metaphorical and cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical components without a loss of substance. Modern behaviouristic philosophy attempts such an analysis in the case of certain moral concepts, it seems to me without success." IRIS MURDOCH, "The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts" PrefaceThanks are due to many people, without whose support (of whatever kind) I could not have written this book. First of all, I owe many thanks to my parents for the important part they played in the formation of my conscience. The first resource for a philosopher is his own experience. Therefore, it is fortunate (from an academic point of view, at least) that I am not too good a person, in which case I would have had much fewer experiences of conscience to work with; of course it is equally fortunate, for the same reason, that I am not too bad a person. Secondly, special thanks are due to Bert Musschenga, for his sympathetic support and gentle guidance, to my former 'roommates' Govert Buijs and Jos Kole for inspiring and interesting (dissertation-and non-dissertation-related) conversations, to Dick van Lente, Kees Schinkel and Willem Schinkel, for their important and helpful comments in various stages, to Eva Moraal, for listening and for simply being there, and further, for various reasons, to Jonathan Jacobs, Heinz Kittsteiner, Arend Soeteman, and Ben Vermeulen. Thirdly, I would like to thank Nynke Eringa-Boomgaardt for telling me her private story so candidly and for allowing me to use it in my dissertation, as well as the Dutch Minister of Defence for allowing me to make use of conscientious objector files from the Defence Archives. I am grateful to the staff at these archives in Kerkrade, who were extremely helpful. Thanks are due to everyone at Amsterdam University Press, but especially to Patrick Weening, for patiently making one pdf after another. Fourthly, I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this book in some other way: Jan Boersema, Jan Branssen, Patrick Delaere, Lasse Gerrits, Michel Heijdra, Lena Hoppe, Dorothee Horstkoet...

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Section: Socrates' 'Daimonion'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Socrates' 'Daimonion'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…II, § 1). 44 And he uses similar expressions in his early work; see Yolton (1993), lemma 'innate ideas' (110)(111). 45 Idem.…”

Section: 32mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%