Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness

Farrell, Jonathan; McClelland, Tom

doi:10.1007/s13164-017-0331-x

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…The role of awareness in consciousness and its independence from report and self-reflection is well debated in the literature ( Farrell and McClelland, 2017 ). One of the design constraints of this framework is that the state observer and state awareness subsystems need to be external to (i.e., independent of) the sensory processing pathways (internal state) so that their processes do not mutually corrupt each other and to ensure that the prediction (i.e., awareness) is available for the function of the whole system ( Cleeremans, 2011 ; Dehaene et al, 2017 ).…”

Section: A Neural Architecture Necessary For Feelingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Agreeing on what a “feeling” is has been notoriously difficult ( Searle, 2000 ; Carruthers and Schier, 2017 ). Feelings have been variously referred to as “conscious awareness,” “inner awareness,” ( Farrell and McClelland, 2017 ) “subjective experience,” ( Tye, 1986 ; Sytsma and Machery, 2010 ) “something-it-is-like” for the subject ( Nagel, 1974 ), sentience ( Harnad, 2016 ), “phenomenal consciousness” ( Block, 1995 ) and “qualia” ( Tye, 1994 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is widely acknowledged that feelings share a close relationship with awareness ( Natsoulas, 1983 , 1999 ; Berger, 2014 ; Carruthers, 2015 ; McClelland, 2015 ; Farrell and McClelland, 2017 ; Kouider and Faivre, 2017 ; LeDoux and Brown, 2017 ). Given that awareness in any system is dependent on detection of change in the state of the system, then a brain must be able to selectively monitor internal changes in its neural information processing in order to be subsequently aware of them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Key

Brown

2018

Front. Physiol.

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There is compelling evidence that the “what it feels like” subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For instance, cephalopods have been claimed to be sentient on the basis of their complex behavior and anecdotal reports of human-like intelligence. We have interrogated the findings of avoidance learning behavioral paradigms and classical brain lesion studies and conclude that there is no evidence for cephalopods feeling pain. This analysis highlighted the questionable nature of anthropometric assumptions about sensory experience with increased phylogenetic distance from humans. We contend that understanding whether invertebrates such as molluscs are sentient should first begin with defining the computational processes and neural circuitries underpinning subjective awareness. Using fundamental design principles, we advance the notion that subjective awareness is dependent on observer neural networks (networks that in some sense introspect the neural processing generating neural representations of sensory stimuli). This introspective process allows the observer network to create an internal model that predicts the neural processing taking place in the network being surveyed. Predictions arising from the internal model form the basis of a rudimentary form of awareness. We develop an algorithm built on parallel observer networks that generates multiple levels of sensory awareness. A network of cortical regions in the human brain has the appropriate functional properties and neural interconnectivity that is consistent with the predicted circuitry of the algorithm generating pain awareness. By contrast, the cephalopod brain lacks the necessary neural circuitry to implement such an algorithm. In conclusion, we find no compelling behavioral, functional, or neuroanatomical evidence to indicate that cephalopods feel pain.

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Section: A Neural Architecture Necessary For Feelingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Key

Brown

2018

Front. Physiol.

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“…2 These myriad mental representations compose how our self seems 1 I am neutral here on whether and how the self shows up in one's phenomenology, though see Farrell and McClelland (2017). 2 Of course, being a self-representation is not just a matter of representing an entity that happens to be oneself.…”

Section: What Is the Virtual Self Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Virtual Selves

McClelland

2017

Erkenn

Self Cite

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According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our self-representations do not refer to any concrete object and the self is a merely intentional entity. This contemporary version of the 'no-self' theory is driven by a number of psychological and philosophical considerations indicating that our representations of the self are pervasively inaccurate. I present two problems for VST. First, the case for VST fails to rule out a more moderate position according to which the self exists but is systematically misrepresented by us. This position regards the self as a real entity that has illusory appearances, rather than as a hallucinated entity that has a merely intentional existence. Second, I suggest that this 'illusion model' of self-misrepresentation is preferable to VST. Advocates of VST must acknowledge the existence of an entity-typically the brain-that is the bearer of our misrepresentations of the self. I argue that, other things being equal, we should regard the bearer of our self-representations as the self, even if that entity diverges dramatically from the way we represent the self to be. So by acknowledging the existence of a bearer of selfrepresentations, advocates of VST are in a poor position to deny the existence of the self. I conclude that VST not only fails to rule out the illusion model, but that we have prima facie reason to prefer the illusion model to VST.

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“… One might raise doubts regarding the existence of constitutive features of our conscious experience we lack cognitive access to, by appeal to the fact that any legitimate notion of consciousness would pertain to what is ‘within the subject's point of view’ or by stressing the fact that conscious experience are ‘ for the subject’ (Hellie, ). However, whether those are constitutive features of experience is controversial (see Farrell and McClelland ). Moreover, there seems to be no conceptual need to spell this out in terms of cognitive access.…”

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confidence: 99%

Access, phenomenology and sorites

Sebastián

2018

Ratio

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The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is nontransitive-a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness.In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

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Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness

Cited by 20 publications

References 55 publications

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc

Against Virtual Selves

Access, phenomenology and sorites

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