Effect of habitat destruction on cooperation in public goods games

Yang, Xiqing; Zhang, Feng; Wang, Wanxiong; Zhang, Di; Shi, Zhanhong; Zhou, Sheng

doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126276

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…We start by noting that the payoff structure proposed in Eqs. (1) and (2) , is akin to the public goods and climate change dilemma games [99] , [100] , [101] , [102] where each agent payoff depends on the total number of agents in some other state. That is, the quarantine game is not a pairwise interaction game such as the prisoner dilemma [8] .…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Amaral

Oliveira

Javarone

2021

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

100

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During pandemic events, strategies such as social distancing can be fundamental to reduce simultaneous infections and mitigate the disease spreading, which is very relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be recommended, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated. To better understand these dynamics, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory for combining in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. In particular, we consider a disease spreading through a population, whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent’s health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent’s strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine. In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk perception is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Amaral

Oliveira

Javarone

2021

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

100

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We start by noting that the payoff structure proposed in Eqs. ( 1) and (2), is akin to the public goods and climate change dilemma games [87][88][89][90] where each agent payoff depends on the total number of agents in some other state. That is, the quarantine game is not a pairwise interaction game such as the prisoner dilemma [8].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Amaral,

de Oliveira,

Javarone

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

During pandemic events, strategies such as quarantine and social distancing can be fundamental to curb viral spreading. Such actions can reduce the number of simultaneous infection cases and mitigate the disease spreading, which is relevant to the risk of a healthcare system collapse. Although these strategies can be suggested, or even imposed, their actual implementation may depend on the population perception of the risks associated with a potential infection. The current COVID-19 crisis, for instance, is showing that some individuals are much more prone than others to remain isolated, avoiding unnecessary contacts, and respecting other restrictions. With this motivation, we propose an epidemiological SIR model that uses evolutionary game theory to take into account dynamic individual quarantine strategies, intending to combine in a single process social strategies, individual risk perception, and viral spreading. The disease spreads in a population whose agents can choose between self-isolation and a lifestyle careless of any epidemic risk. The strategy adoption is individual and, most importantly, depends on the perceived disease risk compared to the quarantine cost. The game payoff governs the strategy adoption, while the epidemic process governs the agent's health state. At the same time, the infection rate depends on the agent's strategy while the perceived disease risk depends on the fraction of infected agents. Our results show recurrent infection waves phenomena, which are usually seen in previous historic epidemic scenarios with voluntary quarantine. In particular, such waves re-occur as the population reduces disease awareness. Notably, the risk perception parameter is found to be fundamental for controlling the magnitude of the infection peak, while the final infection size is mainly dictated by the infection rates. Low awareness leads to a single and strong infection peak, while a greater disease risk perception leads to shorter, although more frequent, peaks. The proposed model spontaneously captures relevant aspects of a pandemic event, highlighting the fundamental role of social strategies.

show abstract

“…Among many different applications, a current use of the PGG is the modeling of climate changes (collective risk dilemma) [15,16,17,18,19], where it is possible to understand the consequences of the maintenance of cooperation and observe strategies to avoid catastrophic scenarios. Although humans are a highly cooperative species, historically we see that the exploration of natural resources, other species, and even of our own species generates deep impacts on the planet, due to the temptation of individuals and countries to increase their gain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Symbiotic behaviour in the Public Goods game with altruistic punishment

Flores,

Fernandes,

Amaral

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still an enigma in behavioural science. In the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive environments. Here, we introduce altruistic punishers in the spatial public goods game which punish all defectors in their vicinity, while bearing a cost to do so. We observe three distinct behaviours in our model: i) in the absence of punishers, cooperators are driven to extinction by defectors for most parameter values; ii) clusters of punishers thrive by sharing the punishment costs when these are low iii) for higher punishment costs, punishers, when alone, are subject to exploitation but in the presence of cooperators can form a symbiotic spatial structure that benefits both. This last observation is our main finding since neither cooperation nor punishment alone can survive the defector strategy in this parameter region and the specificity of the symbiotic spatial configuration shows that lattice topology plays a central role in sustaining cooperation. Results were obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations on a square lattice and subsequently confirmed by a comparison of different strategies' payoff under pair approximation, leading to a phase diagram of the possible states.

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Effect of habitat destruction on cooperation in public goods games

Cited by 3 publications

References 49 publications

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics

Symbiotic behaviour in the Public Goods game with altruistic punishment

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