Effect of heterogeneous sub-populations on the evolution of cooperation

Huang, Keke; Zheng, Xiaoping; Su, Yunpeng

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2015.08.057

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Heterogeneity has been investigated to promote cooperation in the recent literature [21][22][23][24]. Heterogeneous networks are more conducive to cooperative behaviour than homogeneous networks [25].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Yue

2021

Complexity

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Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Yue

2021

Complexity

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“…As a mathematical tool, game theory mainly focuses on the competitive and cooperative relationship of the participants, and it has been widely applied in the field of cooperation. Typical examples of evolutionary games include repeated prisoners' dilemma and snowdrift games [5][6][7]. In [8], Shen et al compare different methods of games and regard the evolutionary game as a good method to solve the problem of node cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2018

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task. In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS. We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS. When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies. Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model. One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state. The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding. The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given. We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained. The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.

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“…Therefore, exploring the extensive cooperation behaviors becomes an open challenge and attract the attentions of scientific researchers in a myriad of fields including physics, mathematics, biology and behavioral science678910. In addition to being a good tool for the decision problem11121314, evolutionary game theory has been generally accepted as the common framework to tackle the issue. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), the snowdrift game (SDG) and the stag-hunt game (SHG) are often employed as the metaphors for the social dilemmas15161718192021.…”

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confidence: 99%

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

Chang

Zhang

et al. 2017

Sci Rep

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Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world.

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Effect of heterogeneous sub-populations on the evolution of cooperation

Cited by 12 publications

References 49 publications

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

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