Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

Wu, Yue; Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Deng, Zhenghong

doi:10.1038/srep41076

Cited by 51 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(62 reference statements)

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“…Notwithstanding, since several details might deserve further attention, we report those we consider potentially more interesting. For instance, the proposed model could be analyzed considering populations arranged on complex networks [85,86], social behaviors like conformism [87][88][89] could be combined with random perturbations, and as suggested in [60], also some clinical investigations could find it useful to represent specific biological phenomena by the proposed method.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Amaral

Javarone

2020

Phys. Rev. E

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We analyze the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [Proc. R. Soc. A 476, 20200116 (2020)] reported that while cooperation is sustained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the description of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results, achieved by analyzing the proposed model under a variety of configurations as different update rules, suggest that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a nontrivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards nonordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation and greatly delay its extinction.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Amaral

Javarone

2020

Phys. Rev. E

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“…In recent years, an important factor reward, as a novel means to promote the cooperation, has aroused extensive attention [55][56][57][58]. Reward, as a means of motivation in real life, is a measure of coruscating people's sense of honor and enterprise, and a management to mobilize the enthusiasm of administrative personal and management counterparts and to explore the potential capacity to the maximum extent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Reciprocal Rewarding on the Evolution of Cooperation in Voluntary Social Dilemmas

Wang

Xia

et al. 2019

Front. Phys.

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Voluntary participation, as an effective mechanism to promote cooperation in game theory, has been widely concerned. In the meanwhile, reciprocal rewarding plays an important role in motivating individual initiative. Inspired by this phenomenon, we investigate the effect of reciprocal rewarding on the evolutionary cooperation in spatial social dilemmas, including prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game with voluntary participation. In our model, a cooperative individual fitness will be redefined if one could obtain additional incentive bonus which is proportional to the number of cooperative neighbors. Moreover, each individual is a pure strategist in the spatial structured population and could only choose one of three strategies-cooperation, defection and being a loner. Through numerical simulations, we have confirmed that, compared with the traditional situation, reciprocal rewarding and the payoff of loner can significantly promote the cooperative behavior among the population, and the greater the contribution of reciprocal rewarding/payoff of loner, the more obvious the promoting effect on cooperation. In addition, we also find that there is a condition for loner to make the system fall into the three-strategy cyclic dominance, that is, the payoff of loner can not be too small or too large, which will destroy the situation of cyclic dominance. With regard to these results, it is strongly unveiled that reciprocal rewarding has a positive role to resolve the social dilemmas in the evolution of cooperation.

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“…The prisoner’s dilemma depicts the conflict of interest between the individual and the whole group. Therefore, specific mechanisms for interpreting the emergence and sustainability of cooperation are proposed, for example, different coevolution setup 25 – 28 , reputation 29 – 31 , reward 32 , 33 , punishment 34 – 37 , different evolution dynamics 38 , 39 , heterogeneity 40 – 45 , and so on. Nowak attributed all theses to the following mechanism: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection 46 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Zhang

2018

Sci Rep

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The impact of environment on individuals is particularly critical. In evolutionary games, adopting the strategy of the neighbor who performs better is nontrivial for the survival and maintenance of cooperation, in that such an action may help the agents to obtain higher benefit and more obvious evolutionary advantages. Inspired by this idea, we investigate the effect of the environment-based preference selection on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma. A simple rule, incorporating individual preference selection via an adjustable parameter α to explore how the selection of the potential strategy sources influences individual behavior traits, is considered. Because social interaction may not be the only way of generating payoffs, we assume that the individual’s income is also affected by the environment. Besides, taking into account individual differences, we introduce the heterogeneity of the environment. Through numerous computing simulations, we find that environment-based preference selection, which accelerates the microscopic organization of cooperator clusters to resist the aggression of defectors, can truly promote cooperation within a large range of parameters. Our study indicates that the combination of heterogeneity and preference selection may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.

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Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

Cited by 51 publications

References 61 publications

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

Effects of Reciprocal Rewarding on the Evolution of Cooperation in Voluntary Social Dilemmas

Environment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

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