Effects of carbon tax on environment under duopoly

Chen, You-hua; Nie, Pu‐yan; Wang, Chan

doi:10.1007/s10668-020-01222-x

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…For the carbon tax policy, Dou et al [15] introduce the carbon tax policy into a supply chain system with two-phase production to explore the differential impacts of the tax price on the different production phases. Chen et al [16] analyzed the impact of the carbon tax on environmental regulation under a duopoly market structure. For subsidy policies, Cohen et al [17] discussed the impact of demand uncertainty on customer subsidy policy.…”

Section: Carbon Emission Reduction Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Reduction Incentives under Multi-Market Interactions: Supply Chain Vertical Cooperation Perspective

Huang,

He,

Mao

2024

Mathematics

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The greening trend in consumer markets and the marketization and financialization of carbon emission rights have begun to revitalize carbon assets. However, solitary efforts and the spillover of environmental protection effects still hamper enterprises’ enthusiasm for carbon emission reduction. To tackle this challenge, two vertical cooperation mechanisms, cost cooperation and alliance cooperation, are proposed. The mathematical models and solutions are developed for both of the two mechanisms, and their values and applicability are explored, respectively. In addition, the impact of fluctuations in consumer markets, financial markets, and carbon markets on cooperation is examined. The results show that both cooperation models effectively motivate enterprises to enhance carbon reduction and boost market demand. However, cost cooperation may result in inflated product prices and even weaken the profitability of the supply chain. In contrast, alliance cooperation can enhance product price performance and effectively increase supply chain profits. Concerning environmental performance, the initial market is better suited for alliance cooperation, whereas cost cooperation fits the mid-to-late market. The higher financing costs of the financial market and the trading price of the carbon market will strengthen the applicability of cost cooperation. This study offers managerial insights for collaborative decision-making in the context of a multi-market cross-section.

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Section: Carbon Emission Reduction Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Reduction Incentives under Multi-Market Interactions: Supply Chain Vertical Cooperation Perspective

Huang,

He,

Mao

2024

Mathematics

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“…There is much literature on carbon emission policies, which start from the effect, mechanism, and influencing factors (Bárcena-Ruiz & Campo, 2012;Chen et al, 2021a;Colla et al, 2012;Holland, 2012;Ikefuji et al, 2016;Zhou et al, 2019). Bárcena-Ruiz & Sagasta (2021) compare the equilibrium results under environmental taxes, tradable emissions permits and emission standards and find that governments prefer to set tradable emissions permits when possible.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon emission reduction policy with privatization in an oligopoly model

Chen

Sun

Wang

et al. 2023

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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This paper constructs a mixed oligopoly model composed of a public enterprise and two private enterprises, and explores the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. In addition, this paper also analyzes the optimal carbon emission trading price and the optimal privatization level decision. The results show that the proportion of state-owned shares and the equity efficiency gap have impacts on the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. Privatization increases the profits of public firm but does not necessarily promote social welfare. Different carbon emission policy decisions have different impacts on the equilibrium results, and the emission reduction target is not completely consistent with the maximum social welfare target. The government can intervene by setting carbon emissions trading prices and making privatization decisions. Both full and partial privatization may be the optimal decision. Keywords: carbon emission policy; privatization; oligopoly; carbon emission trading price 1. Introduction With the increasingly negative impact of climate change, more and more attention is paid to the issue of carbon emissions (Sarkar et al. 2022a,b;Wang et al. 2022;Taleizadeh et al. 2021). It has become an international consensus to reduce carbon emissions through active policy measures (Chen & Nie, 2020a;Dabaghian et al. 2022). As early as 1997, to coordinate carbon emission behaviors, the participating countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change formulated the "Kyoto Protocol". One of the important emission reduction policies is to

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“…At present, a variety of incentives already exist in the real market for enterprises to pay more for carbon reduction behavior. Among them, policy incentives are the most common, such as carbon trading policy [17][18][19][20][21][22][23], carbon tax policy [24,25], carbon standard policy [26,27], fuel tax policy [28,29], financial subsidy policy [30][31][32] etc. These studies systematically described the impact of carbon emission reduction policies, and provide ideas for supply chain players to make a green transformation in different policy contexts.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internal incentives for carbon emission reduction in a capital-constrained supply chain: A financial perspective

Huang

2023

PLoS ONE

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Capital constraints hinder enterprises’ carbon reduction efforts and affect the sustainability of the supply chain. To alleviate this limitation, the core enterprise considers offering two financial-based carbon reduction incentive mechanisms: cost-sharing mechanism (CS) and preferential financing mechanism (PF). In a supply chain with the dual sensitivity of market demand to price and carbon reduction, we model each incentive mechanism, discussing their impact, value, and selection strategies. The results show that neither party under CS pursues an excessively high share ratio. Only a below-threshold sharing ratio can promote the supplier’s carbon reduction behavior and improve efficiency for both parties. Conversely, PF has a stable incentive effect on the supplier’s carbon reduction behavior and can effectively increase the retailer’s profits. However, a reasonable carbon reduction standard is needed to attract the supplier. In addition, as market demand becomes more sensitive to carbon reduction, the feasible range of CS narrows and that of PF expands. We compare players’ preferences of PF and CS and find a Pareto region in which all players prefer PF to CS. Finally, we test the robustness of our findings by an extending model. Our study provides guidance for supply chain decisions facing dual pressures of financial constraints and carbon reduction.

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Effects of carbon tax on environment under duopoly

Cited by 7 publications

References 22 publications

Carbon Reduction Incentives under Multi-Market Interactions: Supply Chain Vertical Cooperation Perspective

Carbon Reduction Incentives under Multi-Market Interactions: Supply Chain Vertical Cooperation Perspective

Carbon emission reduction policy with privatization in an oligopoly model

Internal incentives for carbon emission reduction in a capital-constrained supply chain: A financial perspective

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