Effects of directional migration on prisoner’s dilemma game in a square domain

Cheng, Hongyan; Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Qian, Xiaolan; Zhang, M.; Yang, Junzhong

doi:10.1140/epjb/e2013-40076-5

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…We proceed by testing the robustness of conformityenhanced network reciprocity, first by considering an alternative formulation of the social dilemma. So far, to obtain results that are comparable with previous related works [77,78], we have focused on the weak prisoner's dilemma, which does not constitute the most adverse conditions for the successful evolution of cooperation since the punishment for mutual defection and the suckers payoff are equal (P = S = 0). To amend this, we consider the donation game, where the payoff ranking T > R > P > S corresponds to the true prisoner's dilemma.…”

Section: Cmentioning

confidence: 73%

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

Szolnoki

Perc

2015

J. R. Soc. Interface.

221

115

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The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behaviour in humans and social animals also compel to conformity in their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favour of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.

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Section: Cmentioning

confidence: 73%

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

Szolnoki

Perc

2015

J. R. Soc. Interface.

221

115

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show abstract

“…Within the evolutionary game theory framework, after several sparse, early attempts to include mobility [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27], it was only recently that the interest in the combined effects of mobility and cooperation in the PD game had a significant increase. Some level of information processing capability is required, for example, when the movement is strategy dependent [28,29] or driven by payoff [30][31][32][33], success [34][35][36][37] or the neighborhood composition [38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45]. However, the simplest scenario is when mobility is diffusive [29,[46][47][48][49][50][51][52][53].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When diffusion occurs on a lattice and the one agent per site constraint holds, this area exclusion couples the diffusivity of the agents with the free area. This dependence on density, on the other hand, is not immediately present in off-lattice systems with point-like particles [33,42,45,49,56]. Moreover, while on a lattice the number of simultaneous interactions is limited by its coordination number, there is no such restriction on the number of point-like particles within the range of interaction in off-lattice systems (unless it is explicitly included as in Ref.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents: Geometric and strategy clusters

2014

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We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rP that accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint that defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rP = 0 case, the model with finite sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases in which either cooperators or defectors dominate. We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size.

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Reinforcement learning explains various conditional cooperation

Geng

Liu

et al. 2022

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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Effects of directional migration on prisoner’s dilemma game in a square domain

Cited by 11 publications

References 39 publications

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents: Geometric and strategy clusters

Reinforcement learning explains various conditional cooperation

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