According to the proponents of Developmental Systems Theory and the Causal Parity Thesis, the privileging of the genome as "first among equals" with respect to the development of phenotypic traits is more a reflection of our own heuristic prejudice than of ontology -the underlying causal structures responsible for that specified development no more single out the genome as primary than they do other broadly "environmental" factors. Parting with the methodology of the popular responses to the Thesis, this paper offers a novel criterion for "causal primacy", one that is grounded in the ontology of the unique causal role of dispositional properties. This paper argues that, if the genome is conceptualised as realising dispositional properties that are "directed toward" phenotypic traits, the parity of "causal roles" between genetic and extra-genetic factors is no longer apparent, and further, that the causal primacy of the genome is both plausible and defensible.What is it about the causal nature of the genome that singles it out, over and above all the other causal factors present within the cellular architecture, as primus inter pares? According to the proponents of "Developmental Systems Theory", the simple answer is nothing. Although it is certainly true that at least since the time when the molecular basis and structure of the genome was discovered and detailed it has occupied a privileged theoretical role in every subsequent respectable scientific ontology, according to the "developmentalist" perspective, "…the empirical differences between the role of DNA and that of [the surrounding cellular architecture] do not justify the metaphysical distinctions currently built upon them" 1 . The denial of these "metaphysical distinctions", on the part of the developmentalist perspective, is based upon the affirmation of the causal parity thesis, which could be stated as follows: there is no genuine, principled, ontological distinction between the causal contribution of genetic factors and those of nongenetic factors that establishes one type as causally primary with respect to the specified production of proteins, and thus the formation of phenotypic traits.In this paper I argue that, armed with a proper understanding of the nature of the causal structure of the genome, the thesis of causal parity is false. The argument I offer is based on the plausible supposition that the genome realises dispositional properties. I claim that if the unique causal role of dispositional properties is properly understood, a powerful response to the causal parity thesis is at hand. Armed with that understanding, we are afforded a novel conception of what it is to be "causally primary" with respect to some effect. That conception of causal primacy, I argue, is well-suited to provide an answer to the developmentalist argument, and to declare the genome as causally primary with respect to the formation of phenotypic traits.