Effects of the use of control systems

Abstract

This research explored the moderating effects of subordinate participation in decision making and subordinate job difficulty on their responses to different uses of control systems by their superiors. In a sample of managers from a moderately large U.S. organization, both of these factors were found to moderate the ways subordinates responded to the perceptions that their superiors used control systems for goal setting, evaluation, problem solving, and contingent reward allocations.The results of the study indicated that the use of control systems for contingent reward allocation produced defensive subordinate responses under all conditions, but also produced the functional response of effort when subordinate participation was low and job difficulty high. The use for goal setting appeared to result in functional responses when subordinate participation was high, and in dysfunctional responses when participation was low. The use for evaluation and the use for problem solving both seemed to be aspects of a collaborative developmental use of the control systems. This use pattern appeared to have primarily functional effects, although the results were more functional when the subordinate jobs were not difficult, and when they participated in decision making. Based on the results several propositions are formulated for future testing.

Relationship of Budgetary Slack With Participation and Emphasis on Budget and Information Asymmetry

“…Esta preocupação observada na literatura não é corroborada em pesquisas de Cammann (1976) e Merchant (1985. Estes autores mostram resultados contrários e descobriram que quando os subordinados são permitidos a participar do processo orçamentário, a probabilidade de criação de folga é menor.…”

“…E se os subordinados percebem que a sua recompensa depende da realização do orçamento, é evidente a criação de folga durante o processo de participação. Cammann (1976) também advertiu que quando os superiores dão ênfase no orçamento e se tiver algum tipo de recompensa associado com o alcance das metas estabelecidas, os subordinados tendem a criar folga. Isso sugere que quanto maior a ênfase no orçamento para determinar a remuneração por recompensa, maior será a propensão da criação de folga.…”

“…Entretanto, Onsi (1973), Cammann (1976), Merchant (1985) forneceram evidências que a participação dos gestores pode levar à redução da folga, atribuindo isso à comunicação positiva entre os superiores e subordinados para que esses se sintam menos pressionados a criar folga orçamentária. Dunk e Perera (1997) explicam que os resultados contraditórios sugerem que a relação entre participação no orçamento e folga orçamentária não é tão simples, podendo ser dependente de outros fatores.…”

The Effect of Emphasis on Tight Budget Targets and Cost Control on Production and Marketing Managers' Propensity to Create Slack

“…An emphasis on tight budget targets is related to the organization's planning phase and includes the importance the organization attaches to the setting of tight and accurate budgetary targets (Simons, 1986). A high emphasis on tight budget targets may lead to high propensity of subordinates to create slack because the pressure of tight budget targets may increase their incentive to create slack (Hopwood, 1972;Onsi, 1973;Cammann, 1976;Merchant, 1985a;Dunk, 1993).…”

Intensitas Kompetisi Pasar Dan Budget Emphasis Pada Hubungan Antara Partisipasi Dan Senjangan Anggaran

“…Hasil penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya, yang menguji hubungan antara partisipasi dan senjangan anggaran menunjukkan hasil yang tidak konsisten. Penelitian yang dilakukan Camman (1976), Dunk (1993), Merchant (1985) dan Onsi (1973) menunjukkan bahwa partisipasi dalam anggaran mengurangi jumlah senjangan anggaran karena adanya komunikasi yang baik antara manajer atasan dan bawahan sehingga mengurangi perasaan tertekan untuk menciptakan senjangan anggaran. Sedangkan Lukka (1988) dan Young (1985) menunjukkan hasil yang berlawanan.…”