Effects of time cost on the evolution of cooperation in snowdrift game

Jia, Pu; Jia, Tao; Li, Ya

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.05.030

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Are there mechanisms to promote cooperation and avoid conflict? These fascinating questions continue to attract many researchers to dive in [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

Gong¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals can acquire their neighbor's information without cost after generating information. In fact, the environment and cognition of populations often limit the magnitude of information received by individuals. Our model divides information dynamics into two processes: generation and dissemination. After generating, information starts to disseminate in the population. Individuals match and interact with each other based on the information received and then confirm partnerships, which differs from traditional research's unilateral partner selection process. Specifically, we find a function to simulate two constraints of information acquisition in different populations: information dissemination cost and cognition competence. These two kinds of constraints affect the choice of partnership and then the evolution of cooperation. The game evolved under the condition of information constraints. Through large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we find that information dissemination and cognition underlie the evolution of cooperation. The lower cost of information dissemination and the more valid cognition of information, the higher level of cooperation. Moreover, deviations in cognition among individuals more sensitively determine the equilibrium cooperation density. As the deviations increase, cooperation density decreases significantly. This paper provides a new explanation for the diversity of cooperation among populations with different information dissemination costs and cognition competence.

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“…Are there mechanisms to promote cooperation and avoid conflict? These fascinating questions continue to attract many researchers to dive in [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

Gong¹

2022

Preprint

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“…In 2019, some scholars suggested that time cost in the snowdrift game can also promote the level of cooperation [41]. They assume that two drivers are stuck on the road.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The mechanism of individual time cost heterogeneity promotes cooperation in snowdrift game

Wang

2020

Preprint

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Cost of time passing plays an important role when investigate the collective behaviour in real world. Each rational individual can get a more reasonable strategy by comprehensively considering the time cost. Motivated by the fact, we here propose a mechanism with individual time cost heterogeneity whose core lies in two aspects: 1. The individuals in the rule network are divided into 2 groups: high-time cost and low-time cost. 2. Each individual is endowed with a time cost parameter, and the individuals take into account the effect of time cost on the benefit when they interact with a neighbour. The synchronous updating algorithm is used to study the evolution of cooperation with time cost on a regular lattice. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively promotes cooperation in the snowdrift game. Moreover, it is revealed that the following reasons lead to a higher level of cooperation: The higher time cost, the more individuals of high-time cost in the group, and the more differences of time cost between groups when low-time cost remains unchanged.

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“…Lately, new network models have emerged that effectively capture the most important structural properties of real-world networks, such as random geometric graphs in hyperbolic spaces. These models are known for having realistic features, such as small diameter, high clustering, community structure, and a heterogeneous degree distribution [34,35], making them a popular choice for simulating a range of social phenomena, including evolutionary game theory [36][37][38][39][40][41].…”

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confidence: 99%

Unexpected paths to cooperation on tied hyperbolic networks

Duh

Gosak

Perc

2023

EPL

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Hyperbolic networks have high clustering, short average path lengths, and community structure, which are all properties that are commonly associated with social networks. As such, these networks constitute the perfect playing ground for probing factors that may affect public cooperation in realistic scenarios. And although much is already known about the evolution of cooperation on networks, we here consider the public goods game on tied hyperbolic networks, such that payoffs in one network layer influence the payoffs in the other and vice versa. We also consider random, assortative, and disassortative mixing in the networks to account for varying connections between players over time. While our research confirms the overall positive impact of interdependent payoffs, we also find that mixing on the network where cooperation thrives may strongly promote the cooperation in the other network, while destroying it completely in the former. We show that this is related to the mapping of lower payoffs from one network to the other, where cooperators in one network benefit from the failure of cooperators in the other network. Namely, as soon as the multiplication factor for the public goods is high enough to nullify the negative effects of mixing and cooperators thus recover, the positive effect on cooperation in the other network vanishes. We determine optimal conditions for this phenomenon in terms of the frequency of mixing and the strength of ties between the payoffs on both networks, and we discuss the implications of our research for enhanced cooperation in coupled populations, in particular in the light of mutual success not always being desirable for cooperation to thrive.

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Effects of time cost on the evolution of cooperation in snowdrift game

Cited by 19 publications

References 36 publications

Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

The mechanism of individual time cost heterogeneity promotes cooperation in snowdrift game

Unexpected paths to cooperation on tied hyperbolic networks

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