Efficient and Equitable Impact Fees for Urban Water Systems

Lippai, Istvan; Heaney, James P.

doi:10.1061/(asce)0733-9496(2000)126:2(75)

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…These models are often used to analyze coalition formation, voting problems or optimal resource allocation problems. Cooperative stability definitions including Core (Gillies 1953), Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950(Nash , 1953, Shapley value (Shapley 1953), NashHarsanyi solution (Harsanyi 1959), Nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969), Kalai-Smorodinski solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975), and τ-value (Tijs 1981) have been commonly used in modeling water resources games (Straffin and Heaney 1981;Young et al 1981;Szidarovszky et al 1984;Kilgour et al 1988;Dinar et al 1992;Dinar and Wolf 1994;Lejano and Davos 1995;Dinar and Howitt 1997;Lippai and Heaney 2000;Wang et al 2003;Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmen 2004;Wu and Whittington 2006;Ganji et al 2007;Salazar et al 2007;Wang et al 2008a, b;Kucukmehmetoglu 2009;Madani 2011). As an example of the utilization of concepts from cooperative game theory, consider the recently formulated Cooperative Water Allocation Model (CWAM) of Wang et al (2003Wang et al ( , 2008a.…”

Section: Game Theory In Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

Madani

Hipel

2011

Water Resour Manage

132

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In game theory, potential resolutions to a conflict are found through stability analysis, based on stability definitions having precise mathematical structures. A stability definition reflects a decision maker's behavior in a conflict or game, predicts how the game is played, and suggests the resolutions or equilibria of the dispute. Various stability definitions, reflecting different types of people with different levels of foresight, risk attitude, and knowledge of opponents' preferences, have been proposed for resolving games. This paper reviews and illustrates six stability definitions, applicable to finite strategy strategic non-cooperative water resources games, including Nash Stability, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited-Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability. The introduced stability definitions are applied to an interesting and highly informative range of generic water resources games to show how analytical results vary based on the applied stability definitions. The paper suggests that game theoretic models can better simulate real conflicts if the applied stability definitions better reflect characteristics of the players. When there is a lack of information about the types of decision makers, the employment of a range of stability definitions might improve the strategic results and provide useful insights into the basic framework of the conflict and its resolution.

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Section: Game Theory In Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

Madani

Hipel

2011

Water Resour Manage

132

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“…In addition, water-sector infrastructure literature offers inconsistent definitions of equity and does not explicitly distinguish between equity and equality. Equity studies in the water sector have focused on water affordability, − water quality, and health exposures, the view that water is a right or economic good, , and the spatial distribution of water services . These studies do not propose an operational definition for use in practice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward Operationalizing Equity in Water Infrastructure Services: Developing a Definition of Water Equity

Osman

Faust

2021

ACS EST Water

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Access to clean, reliable water services is not a guarantee for all U.S. communities. The challenges related to such service failures have inequitable impacts on low-income neighborhoods and communities of color. How equity is defined and operationalized in water-sector infrastructure is inconsistent across the literature and in practice. This inconsistency can make it challenging to hold utilities accountable for unequal distributions of burden (e.g., lack of affordability and poor water quality). As such, this study seeks (1) to determine how equity is currently defined and used in the water sector, (2) to develop a definition that can be used to incorporate equity into water-sector infrastructure, and (3) to understand attitudes toward equity of water-sector professionals. We conduct a qualitative analysis of relevant media articles, survey responses, and semi-structured interviews with water-sector professionals. We propose a definition of equity in water that is informed by the results of this analysis. Categories emerge that can be leveraged to create vertical equity solutions, such as addressing intermittent supply and water-quality issues in vulnerable communities. The definition may be used to operationalize, metricize, and benchmark equitable water policy and practices at all levels of decision making (e.g., federal, state, and local) to ensure an equitable water future.

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“…Lund and Palmer (1997) presented a comprehensive summary of applying multicriteria decision-making and conflict resolution in water resources. Lippai and Heaney (2000) used the core of nperson cooperative games to allocate costs for an urban water system based upon zones, user classes, and/or demand types. Nakas et al (2002) computed the Nash equilibrium, the Nash bargaining solution, and the total cooperative solution to find the compromise pumping rates and withdrawals between El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%