Efficient Distribution of Resources Through Three Levels of Government

Abstract

This paper presents a model for determining how a central government can most efficiently allocate resources among other levels of government. The model explicitly includes the fact that lower levels of government can make independent decisions once they have been given resources by the central government. A key feature of the model is the mathematical formulation of the central government's objective of distributing resources efficiently, while at the same time being as fair as possible to all those receiving allocations. An algorithm for solving the model is presented along with a numerical example.

Branch-and-Sandwich: a deterministic global optimization algorithm for optimistic bilevel programming problems. Part I: Theoretical development

“…It is clear by (22) and (InKKT 0 ) that the first-order conditions of (22) coincide with the KKT conditions of the original inner problem (2). 8 A finite problem approximating problem (21), and equivalently (20) and (IUB 0 ), is:f…”

“…Then, let (x 0 ,x,ȳ) be a locally optimal point in (RIUB 0 ) andf loc be the corresponding objective value. Such a point may be infeasible in (20) (and in (21)). Namely, it could happen thatȳ…”

“…For instance, the allocation of resources by a federal government is a multilevel allocation process where one level of government distributes resources to several lower levels of government [20]. The overall objective of such a process is to achieve the goals of the federal government.…”

Proceedings of the workshop on national/regional energy-environmental modeling concepts, May 30-June 1, 1979

“…This approach became very popular subsequent to Dantzig-Wo1fe' s formulation of the decomposition principle (Dantzig and Wolfe 1960) and Bender's partitioning procedure (Benders 1962). Baumol and Fabian (1964) saw the similarities between the block angular structure of the Dantzig- Abel-Khalik and Lusk, 1971, Aoki 1971, Atkins 1973, Cassidy, Kirby and Raike 1971, Charnes, Clower and Kortanek 1967, Hass 1968, Heal 1971, Jennergren 1973, Krouse 1972, Weitzman 1970; of resource directive mechanisms (Geoffrion 1970, Kornai and Liptak 1965, Silverman 1972, Ten Kate 1972and Zschau 1966 as well as of hybrid mechanisms (Atkins 1973, andEnnuste 1973) abound.…”

Cooperative n-person Stackelberg games

“…Some of this work can be found in Anandalingam [1], Beckmann [8], Cassidy, et al [21], Dirickx and Jennergren [25], Goreux [28], Haimes, et al [29], Hax, et al [30], Keeney and Raiffa [33], Koopmans [34], Marschak and Radner [40], and Wendell [57].…”