Efficient spoofing identification using baseline vector information of multiple receivers

Seo, Seong-Hun; Lee, Byung-Hyun; Im, Sung-Hyuck; Jee, Gyu-In; Kim, Kwan Sung

doi:10.1007/s10291-018-0779-x

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…x vec = H vec θ vec + w vec (12) where x vec Ω 1/2 x vec , H vec Ω 1/2 H vec and w vec Ω 1/2 w vec with covariance cov(w vec ) = σ 2 vec I [15]. The hypothesis test (5) is then used on the pre-whitened model (12), with C = I 2(R−1) and b = 0 2(R−1)×1 . H 0 denotes that all measurements in the test are from spoofing signals and H 1 = ¬H 0 .…”

Section: R1mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Carrier phase double differences are used in [11] to classify spoofing signals based on the time invariance of the double differences in spoofing scenarios with one spoofing transmit antenna, which then are estimated and subtracted from the input signal, leaving authentic signals that can be used for Position, Velocity, and Time (PVT) computations. Spoofing signals are identified using multiple receivers and carrier phase double differences in [12] where both authentic and spoofed signals are acquired and tracked. The signals are divided into two groups based on navigation solution residual tests and carrier phase double differences are then used to identify the authentic and spoofing signal groups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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GNSS Spoofing Mitigation Using Multiple Receivers

Stenberg

Axell

Rantakokko

et al. 2020

2020 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS)

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GNSS receivers are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, where false satellite signals are transmitted to trick the receiver to provide false position and/or time estimates. Novel algorithms are proposed for spoofing mitigation by exchanging double differences of pseudorange, or carrier phase, measurements between multiple GNSS receivers. In scenarios where the spoofing system utilizes a single transmit antenna, the pseudorange, and carrier phase, measurements that are associated with the spoofing signal can be detected and removed. Simulated meaconing attacks generated with a Spirent hardware simulator and measurements obtained with a modified version of GNSS-SDR are used to evaluate the proposed algorithms. Spoofing mitigation using pseudorange measurements is possible, for receivers that are separated at least five meters apart. With a receiver separation of 20 meters, the pseudorange double difference algorithm is able to correctly authenticate at least six of seven pseudoranges within 30 seconds. The carrier phase approach enables mitigation of spoofing signals at shorter receiver distances. However, this approach requires a more accurate time synchronization between the receivers.

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Section: R1mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Spoofing Mitigation Using Multiple Receivers

Stenberg

Axell

Rantakokko

et al. 2020

2020 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS)

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“…For example, carrier phase differences can be used to estimate this direction of arrival [22,25,27]. • One may exploit that counterfeit signals from a single spoofing source are spatially correlated and measure the spatial correlation between the received signals from different satellites [32][33][34]. The work [34] uses correlation at multiple receivers to separately classify authentic and spoofing signals; then, double differences of carrier phase measurements are used to detect the spoofer.…”

Section: Spatial Signal Processing Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…• One may exploit that counterfeit signals from a single spoofing source are spatially correlated and measure the spatial correlation between the received signals from different satellites [32][33][34]. The work [34] uses correlation at multiple receivers to separately classify authentic and spoofing signals; then, double differences of carrier phase measurements are used to detect the spoofer. • Using rotating antennas to measure the spatial correlation of the received GNSS signals [35,36].…”

Section: Spatial Signal Processing Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Kalantari

Larsson

2020

EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process.

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are being the target of various jamming, spoofing, and meaconing attacks. This paper proposes a new statistical test for the presence of multiple spoofers based on range measurements observed by a plurality of receivers located on a rigid body platform. The relative positions of the receivers are known, but the location and orientation of the platform are unknown. The test is based on the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) paradigm and essentially performs a consistency check between the set of observed range measurements and known information about the satellite topology and the geometry of the receiver constellation. Optimal spoofing locations and optimal artificial time delays (as induced by the spoofers) are also determined. Exact evaluation of the GLRT requires the maximum-likelihood estimates of all parameters, which proves difficult. Instead, approximations based on iterative algorithms and the squared-range least squares algorithm are derived. The accuracy of these approximations is benchmarked against Cramér-Rao lower bounds. Numerical examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and show that increasing the number of GNSS receivers makes the attack easier to detect. We also show that using multiple GNSS receivers limits the availability of optimal attack positions.

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“…Comparatively, the signal processing‐based methods only require software upgrades at a low cost. Amongst this type of spoofing‐detection approaches, the single‐antenna‐based ones are principally simpler and more economically desirable than those based on the phased array antenna and multiple antennas or users [7–10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global navigation satellite system spoofing‐detection technique based on the Doppler ripple caused by vertical reciprocating motion

2019

IET Radar, Sonar & Navigation

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Efficient spoofing identification using baseline vector information of multiple receivers

Cited by 16 publications

References 9 publications

GNSS Spoofing Mitigation Using Multiple Receivers

GNSS Spoofing Mitigation Using Multiple Receivers

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Global navigation satellite system spoofing‐detection technique based on the Doppler ripple caused by vertical reciprocating motion

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