Eine effiziente vertikale Verteilung der Exekutivkompetenzen bei der Regulierung von Telekommunikationsmärkten in Europa

Abstract

The present paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of centralising regulatory competencies in the European telecommunications sector. As we demonstrate, political economy suggests that an over- rather than an under-regulation of telecommunications markets has to be expected. This tendency has been strengthened by the allocation of competencies under the new regulatory framework which endows the European Commission with far reaching veto rights under the so-called article 7 procedure. In order to delimit the risk of over-regulation through institutional safeguards, it should be easier for regulators to deregulate than to regulate a market. Current suggestions and ambitions by the Commission to extend its veto right or to even establish a European regulator for telecommunications should be dismissed. Instead, we suggest limiting the Commission’s veto rights to (a) markets, in which regulation creates significant international externalities and (b) cases, where national regulators do not move into the direction of deregulation. If, however, a national regulator decides to deregulate a market, the Commission’s ex ante veto right should be abandoned (but ex post intervention by the Commission still be possible) in order not to hamper deregulation which tends to be the desired result, in principle.

Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey

“…This difference is likely to lead to different decisions (Donald and Sappington, 1997). In both cases there can be bureaucratic effects having to do with career choices and ambitions of bureaucrats that are interested in their budgets and may therefore stand in the way of deregulation (Haucap and Kühling, 2006). Another very major difference between the U.S. 1 The current paper expands on selective aspects of the much longer survey in Vogelsang (2014).…”

“…There can also be brand-name economies (FIOS or Uverse in the U.S.), but all these economies are mostly pecuniary rather than real. In contrast, to the extent that innovations are important and cannot fully be appropriated in intellectual property rights, there could also be economies of scale through the fixed/sunk cost nature of innovations (Haucap and Kühling, 2006) but, to the best of my knowledge, these have not yet been demonstrated for broadband access. Even under the current policy such economies could have been reaped through trans-border mergers, but those have either not happened or have been unsuccessful (Neumann, 2013b).…”

“…It is also characterized by attempts of the central level to achieve more control in order to actually regulate intercountry issues (international roaming) and to "harmonize" telecommunications regulation (and deregulation) throughout the EU (Haucap and Kühling, 2006). Harmonization goes under the appealing heading of the "EU single market".…”

“…Harmonization is also justified to the extent that inter-country differences are simply the result of different policies rather than the result of different geographic or market circumstances. At this point in time the NRAs have much more influence on telecommunications regulation in the EU than the state PUCs have in the U.S. Haucap and Kühling (2006) hypothesize that under two-level regulation at the central/federal and the national/state level there will be (a) a tendency towards over-regulation, because both levels want to regulate, and (b) a shifting emphasis towards more centralized regulation. Since the U.S. has a longer history of telecommunications regulation but appears to regulate less than the EU, hypothesis (a) must be limited by other factors.…”

Regulierung und Deregulierung in Telekommunikationsmärkten: Theorie und Praxis

“…Knieps, 1997, Haucap und Kruse, 2004, Möschel, 2008 sprich die Penetrationsrate im Mobilfunk, sinkt, in der Literatur finden sich jedoch zunehmend Hinweise darauf, dass eben dies nicht der Fall ist (vgl. Littlechild, 2006;Dewenter und Kruse, 2010 13 Vorschläge dazu finden sich bei Haucap und Kühling (2006.…”