Either scholar or activist? Thinking cultural psychology beyond academia

Abstract

Both Robert Innis’s and Svend Brinkmann’s works bring to the fore a notorious, but usually forgotten, topic on cultural psychology: the normative framework that regulates the relation between the researcher and the phenomena studied. In fact, these ‘models of human flourishing’, using authors’ terminology, are scarcely discussed in comparison to theoretical, methodological, and empirical issues. In the present paper, a number of potential reasons for this omission are explored. In particular, it is argued that discussing the normative and pragmatic side of the discipline appears as risky in two directions: turning cultural psychology into activism, and conducting value-laden research. For this purpose, the case of Arthur Jensen's 1969 controversial publication on IQ is discussed. This example is useful to reveal the challenges that cultural psychology must face in order to become more aware of its normative orientations; particularly the pragmatic, social impact associated to conduct research on human issues. Ultimately, it is shown that the apparent risks mentioned before emerge from implicit, outdated conceptions of both activism and scientific activity.

Militância enquanto Convite ao Diálogo: o Caso da Militância Monodissidente

“…A relação entre militância e processos de construção de conhecimento Carré (2016) afirma que seria estranho pensar em um pesquisador que não se implica e não se interessa pelos temas que estuda. É inevitável que as ciências apresentem pontos de vista e um enquadre normativo sobre os quais elas se debruçam, o que implica dizer que não existe neutralidade em ciência.…”

Towards a cultural psychology of science

“…While life experiences make possible to understand the former, they also shed light on another downplayed aspect of scientific activity: the purpose of this activity. As discussed elsewhere (Carre´, 2016), the creation of scientific knowledge is typically assumed to be done with no other purpose than reaching that knowledge, otherwise there seems to be an impending risk of tainting it with unscientific interests (activism, ideologies, etc.). While this commitment to create objective knowledge is in fact crucial-as already discussed-it is not necessarily the only drive for doing science.…”

Toward a cogenetic cultural psychology

“…So far, I have attempted to elaborate a metatheoretical model starting from the concepts discussed in this special issue (Brescó, 2016; Brinkmann, 2016; Carré, 2016; De Luca Picione and Freda, 2016; Ernø, 2016; Innis, 2016; Nedergaard, 2016). Starting from Peirce’s phenomenological modes and Herbst’s cogenetic logic, I have argued that the threshold of sense can be conceptualized as primary distinction, from which an irreducible triadic set emerges in the course of irreversible time.…”

“…At the same time a sign is not such in the environment without the organism interpreting it. And Innis’ argumentation is again in a triadic relationship with the commentaries of Brescó (2016), Brinkmann (2016), Carré (2016), De Luca Picione and Freda (2016), Ernø (2016), and Nedegaard (2016) and the reader. They are all needed to produce meaning out of the discussion.…”

“…), with the result of constructing nondevelopmental systems of oppositions that have often blocked further theoretical developments. For instance, Carre´(2016) nicely shows how the binary opposition between scholars and activists exerts such a blocking action upon the development of science/society relationships (another binary concept!). It is also relevant to say that this kind of binary logic is not developmental, in the sense that only an external condition can alter the relationship, and no novelty can emerge from within the system.…”