By the end of 1776, about 4,000 soldiers belonging to the Portuguese crown threatened the Spanish territories of the Rio de la Plata. In response, King Carlos III ordered the organization and shipment to America of the largest expedition, in terms of resources, which had been seen so far. On November 13 of this year, one hundred and sixteen ships (31 frigates, 2 frigates (urcas), 22 brigantines, 41 frigates (saetias) and 20 frigates of the King) carrying a total of 9,038 men, more than 2,000 pieces of artillery and an amount close to the 800,000 pesos to 8 reales in money,1 left from the ports of Cadiz to the control of the general Pedro de Cevallos, under the protection of 632 cannons.2 The objectives were precise to defend the dominions of the king before the Portuguese threat and to organize administratively the territories adjacent to the zone, (especially the port of Buenos Aires later turned into vice regal capital). In order to carry out such a large company, it was necessary a whole machinery of maintenance, financing, organization and logistics that guarantee its success. This research seeks to make an analysis of the logics of financing and economic administration of the second expedition of Pedro de Cevallos that would arrive to America in 1777,3 investigating the way in which this event energized the local market, being one of the clearest examples of direct injection of own money of the crown to America; To finally answer how the American reality can fit within a new theoretical methodological proposal the fiscal-military state.1−3