2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.012
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Electoral competition and endogenous political institutions: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Next to political parties active on national level -the largest among them being the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) -so-called Free voter associations play a significant role in local politics. They are not formally connected to any political party active on the national level, nor are they associated with a particular political ideology (e.g., Blaeschke, 2014;Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2016).…”
Section: The Role Of Municipalities In Federalist Germanymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Next to political parties active on national level -the largest among them being the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) -so-called Free voter associations play a significant role in local politics. They are not formally connected to any political party active on the national level, nor are they associated with a particular political ideology (e.g., Blaeschke, 2014;Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2016).…”
Section: The Role Of Municipalities In Federalist Germanymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An example of this type of second‐order policy is given in Lyytikäinen and Tukianen (): The maximum number of candidates on electoral lists in Finland is a function of the council size, which changes discontinuously at population thresholds . Another example from Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca () highlights how subtle the interactions among policies can be: In German municipal elections, parties winning less than a certain vote share are denied representation on the council; this constraint is never binding when the municipal council is below a certain size, which implies that there is a population threshold at which the council size increases and a vote share cutoff goes into effect (though this would not be clear without detailed knowledge of the electoral system). In short, a researcher should know a setting intimately before concluding that a given policy (and not other policies) changes at a given population threshold.…”
Section: Compound Treatmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…10 Another example from Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2015) highlights how subtle the interactions among policies can be: in German municipal elections, parties winning less than a certain vote share are denied representation on the council; this constraint is never binding when the municipal council is below a certain size, which implies that there is a population threshold at which the council size increases and a vote share cutoff goes into effect (though this would not be clear without detailed knowledge of the electoral system). In short, a researcher should know a setting intimately before concluding that a given policy (and not other policies) changes at a given population threshold.…”
Section: Discontinuously At Population Thresholdsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An example of this type of second-order policy is given in Lyytikäinen and Tukianen (2013): The maximum number of candidates on electoral lists in Finland is a function of the council size, which changes discontinuously at population thresholds. 7 Another example from Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2015) highlights how subtle the interactions among policies can be: In German municipal elections, parties winning less than a certain vote share are denied representation on the council; this constraint is never binding when the municipal council is below a certain size, which implies that there is a population threshold at which the council size increases and a vote share cutoff goes into effect (though this would not be clear without detailed knowledge of the electoral 5 In Germany and other federal systems, the task of locating relevant thresholds is complicated by the fact that higher-level authorities may also enact policies based on municipal population thresholds; in Germany, for example, the Federal Statistical Office used a different procedure to implement the 2011 census for municipalities above and below 10,000 inhabitants. 6 In the first article for Bavaria in Germany, see Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010); the authors studied the effects of council size on municipal expenditures using population-threshold rules for council size.…”
Section: Documenting the Extent Of Compound Treatmentmentioning
confidence: 99%