Electoral reforms, entry barriers and the structure of political markets: A comparative analysis

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of electoral reforms on entry barriers in political markets. The discussion starts by delineating the theoretical boundaries of various political markets, such as those for participation, parties and government. By taking a cue from industrial organisation theory, the article offers an analysis of entry barriers, both hard and soft, along with their operationalisation for empirical research. Based on this theoretical framework, a single hypothesis is investigated. It posits that the modification of the entry barriers in the market for parties leads to changes in the concentration of the popular vote for party lists. An observable implication of this relationship would be if an electoral reform that raises entry barriers led to subsequent increases in the Herfindahl index (a measure of market concentration), and vice versa. This proposition is empirically tested by a comparative analysis of a new database covering Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The analysis offers support for the following proposition: in most cases the changes in the entry barriers led to a corresponding change of concentration in the market for parties.

Do electoral reforms tend to favour the incumbents? A quantitative analysis

“…Analysing recent Central European electoral reforms, Sebők et al (2019) find support for the hypothesis that incumbents strategically manipulate the entry barriers of the electoral market to their benefits. Remmer (2008) investigates South American electoral reforms.…”

“…Other papers analyse more nuanced aspects of institutional changes, including the impact of fragmentation and volatility on preferences for electoral system types and the established parties' insistence on entry barriers when new parties are emerging (Bawn 1993;Colomer 2005;Núñez et al 2017;Pilet and Bol 2011;Remmer 2008;Sebők et al 2019;Shugart 1992).…”

Voting decision‐making of low‐income consumers: Literature review and research agenda

“…It assumes that the voters choose the political party based on issue positions, candidate image, and party image, and such choice is mostly stable (Ahmed et al, 2017;Campbell et al, 1980) Public choice theory It explains how political decision-making leads to consequences that contradict democratic preferences (Seb} ok et al, 2019) Silence theory It states that people are hesitant to express their opinions as conflicting with the perceived majority public opinion (Kooyman & Wright, 2017) Marshall's theorization of political celebrity It shows that the celebrity status of political figures affects how lowincome consumers vote (Ahmad, 2020;Rai, 2019) Resource-Based View theory…”

“…They may often intend to raise specific issues during the elections (Kapoor & Magesan, 2018). However, entry barriers may be high, given a high election deposit, which gets forfeited if they do not secure sufficient votes (Seb} ok et al, 2019). Even if they contest the elections, they must appropriately position their political brand against the wellknown political parties and their local leaders, who are already within the local power structures (Song, 2020).…”

On the Way to Limited Competitiveness: Political Consequences of the 2011 Electoral Reform in Hungary

“…Thus, ‘Hungary has become a successful laboratory of illiberal governance’ as FIDESZ has transformed the ‘country's institutions to suit ruling party purposes’ (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018: 49). While we are aware that Hungary's illiberal turn has been the result of several factors, we also take into account the link drawn by many authors between the general notion of democratic backsliding and manipulation of electoral rules to undermine electoral competition as a major component of such a process (see, e.g., Bermeo, 2016; Waldner & Lust, 2018; Sebök et al, 2019). Thus, the central question this study seeks to answer is how the electoral system change of 2011 affected the electoral competition in Hungary, with a special focus on electoral competition in single‐member districts (SMDs), which may significantly contribute to the electoral advantage of the ruling party (FIDESZ).…”