Electoral systems and protectionism: an industry‐level analysis

Abstract

Our paper advances the previous literature on the relationship between electoral systems and trade protection in several ways. First, our paper is the first to incorporate disaggregated, product‐level data in a cross‐country study. We find that prior cross‐country results, based on national average tariffs, mask a great deal of underlying industry‐level variation. Second, we introduce an innovative proxy for geographic concentration of ownership that varies both by industry and by country. We find that geographic concentration helps to explain the industry heterogeneity. Greater geographic concentration is linked to higher average tariffs, a finding consistent with the theoretical model.

Economic Geography, Politics, and Policy

“…Evans (2009) finds that countries with plurality systems have higher tariffs, on average, than those with PR systems. Using product-level tariff rates for a cross-section of developed and developing countries, Ardelean & Evans (2013) also show that tariffs are higher, on average, in plurality systems than in PR systems.…”