Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical Kinds

Hendry, Robin Findlay

doi:10.1086/518745

Cited by 88 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Now the entropy of mixing test is obviously very fine-grained. And the effects of isotopic variation are marked in the case of hydrogen compounds to an extent unique for them -in Hendry's words, hydrogen is 'a monster, not a paradigm' (Hendry [2006], p. 868). So it might be urged that we simply dismiss criteria cutting so finely as to distinguish different isotopic and spin isomers.…”

Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He offers a micro-structuralist criterion for elements based on nuclear charge (i.e. atomic number); for compounds, he grants that the similarity relations uniting a single structural isomer and distinguishing it from others 'will need to be assessed case by case' (Hendry [2006], p. 873).…”

Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note, first, that Hendry's criterion is only intended to work for chemical substances, and will not work generally for other items on Putnam's and Kripke's lists of natural kinds. Hendry's criterion is avowedly 'discipline-immanent': motivated by the 15 Hendry also connects his proposal with the externalist's claim that speaker intentions prior to scientific discovery warrant a construal of such discovery as finding out what the extension of a kind term was prior to discovery: 'Lavoisier's intentions uniquely pick out sameness of nuclear charge as the important similarity relation for elements' (Hendry [2006], p. 869).…”

Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality

Häggqvist

Wikforss

2018

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The paper examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics and philosophy of science.We argue that the Kripke-Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed -microessentialism -is untenable even in a 'placeholder' version; and that the currently popular HPC theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent which fails to vindicate the Kripke-Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for antidescriptivist semantics.

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Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Original Microessentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality

Häggqvist

Wikforss

2018

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Chemical details aside, the important lesson of the story concerns the already emphasized survival of the element through all these chemical processes. A scientific analysis of this survival may be found, e.g., in Hendry's (2006) account of the 'core conception', but the very idea that there is something that persists in chemical reactions does not itself seem of empirical origin. Hence the suggested label: 'empirically-informed modal rationalism'.…”

Section: Modal Rationalism or Modal Empiricism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism

Tahko

2016

Modal Epistemology After Rationalism

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In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than 'traditional' modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the 'apriority' of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing their necessity has clouded the role and content of the a priori input, as I have previously argued (Tahko 2015). For instance, the supposed metaphysically necessary identity statement involving water and its microstructure can only be established with the help of a controversial a priori principle concerning the determination of chemical properties by microstructure. The Kripke-Putnam framework of modal epistemology fails precisely because it is unclear whether the required a priori element is present.My positive proposal builds on E. J. Lowe's work. Lowe holds that our knowledge of metaphysical modality is based on our knowledge of essence. Lowe's account strives to offer a uniform picture of modal epistemology: essence is the basis of all our modal knowledge. This is the core of Lowe's modal rationalism. I believe that Lowe's proposal is on the right lines in the case of abstract objects, but I doubt that it can be successfully applied to the case of natural kinds. Accordingly, the case of natural kinds will be my main focus and I will suggest that modal rationalism, at least as it is traditionally understood, falls short of explaining modal knowledge concerning natural kinds. Yet, I think that Lowe has identified something of crucial importance for modal epistemology, namely the essentialist, a priori

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“…Cette correspondance a toutefois été contestée pour ce qui est des termes de sortes biologiques (Dupré 1993) et de substances chimiques (Needham 2000, LaPorte 2004, Weisberg 2006, la critique visant notamment l'exemple de l'identifi cation théorique eau/H2O mis en avant par les partisans de la réduction fonctionnelle. Pour une défense de l'identifi cation théorique eau/H2O et de la correspondance entre termes vernaculaires et termes scientifi ques de substances chimiques, voir la réponse du philosophe de la chimie Robert Findlay Hendry dans (Hendry 2006) et (Hendry 2010).…”

Section: Selon Chalmersunclassified

Identités psychophysiques et inférence à la meilleure explication

Contim

Ludwig

2013

philoso

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La plupart des théoriciens de l’identité des types souscrivent à un physicalisme a posteriori à l’égard des propriétés phénoménales. Selon cette conception, les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau peuvent être justifiés par une inférence à la meilleure explication (IME) partant du fait empirique des corrélations esprit/cerveau. Nous soutenons que la théorie de l’identité ne peut pas s’appuyer sur cette méthodologie abductive. Nous montrons tout d’abord que l’on ne peut pas justifier les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau au moyen d’une IME partant des corrélations esprit/cerveau car cette stratégie conduit à un dilemme : ou bien les corrélations ne sont pas des explananda, ou bien les identités esprit/cerveau doivent être admises comme des faits bruts au même titre que les lois dualistes. Nous montrons ensuite que ces énoncés d’identité peuvent être néanmoins justifiés par une IME partant du pouvoir causal des états phénoménaux. Cette seconde stratégie n’est toutefois d’aucune aide pour la forme a posteriori de théorie de l’identité ici discutée dans la mesure où elle débouche sur un physicalisme de type a priori.Most type identity theorists endorse a posteriori physicalism about phenomenal properties. On such a view, mind/brain identity statements can be justified by an inference to the best explanation (IBE) starting from the empirical premise of mind/brain correlations. We contend that Identity Theory cannot be based on such an abductive methodology. First, we argue that mind/brain identity statements cannot be justified by an IBE from correlations as it leads to the following dilemma : either correlations are trivial facts that cannot pretend to the status of explananda, or mind/brain identities must be admitted as brute facts, just like dualist laws. Second, we show that these identity statements can still be justified by an IBE starting from the premise of mental causation. However, this strategy is of no help for the a posteriori brand of Identity Theory here challenged since the same premise forces one to embrace a priori physicalism

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Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical Kinds

Cited by 88 publications

References 8 publications

Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality

Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality

Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism

Identités psychophysiques et inférence à la meilleure explication

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