normativity of belief ultimately fail. CD normativism, in turn, falls prey to the 'dilemma of regress and idleness': the appeal to rules either leads to some form of regress of rules, or the notion of rule following is reduced to an idle label. We conclude by suggesting that our arguments do not support naturalism: It is a mistake to assume that normativism and naturalism are our only options. Not long ago, 'meaning is normative' was the battle cry of the day. This was largely the result of the enthusiastic reception of Saul Kripke's book on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. There, Kripke argued that meaning is normative in the sense that it essentially involves certain 'oughts'. A candidate for what constitutes the state of my meaning something by a sign, Kripke argued, has to be such that "whatever in fact I (am disposed to) do, there is a unique thing that I should do." 1 This claim struck many people not only as true but also as teaching us something profoundly important about the nature of linguistic meaning. It was suggested that theories of meaning that do not allow for any genuine

No abstract

I offer a defence of individualism by critically examining the preconditions of Tyler Burge's famous thought‐experiment involving the concept of arthritis. I argue that the thought‐experiment relies on a problematic notion of conceptual error, one of which Burge himself should be critical, given his Quinean commitments. Once this misstep in the experiment is made explicit, individualism emerges as a much stronger position than it is usually taken to be. Questioning the assumption that the patient uttering ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ makes a conceptual error makes it possible for the individualist to grant Burge the claim that the patient has the standard concept of arthritis, rather than his own deviant concept, and yet avoid the social externalist conclusions.

Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.

We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43-4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our 'no guidance argument' fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation. In our paper 'Against Content Normativity' (2009) we argue, among other things, that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. In his reply, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen investigates what we shall call the 'no guidance argument' in some detail and comes to the conclusion that it fails. More precisely, he maintains that it fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We shall argue that there is no such conflation. The controversy concerns the idea that there is an essential normative connection between belief and truth. Thus, it has been suggested that it is constitutive of belief to be governed by some version of the truth norm: (N) One ought to believe that p (if and) only if p 1 Both the exact formulation of the truth norm, and the scope of the 'ought' in it, are a matter of dispute amongst its proponents. The no guidance argument, however, is independent of these issues. It is not directed against the validity of the truth norm in general, but targets