normativity of belief ultimately fail. CD normativism, in turn, falls prey to the 'dilemma of regress and idleness': the appeal to rules either leads to some form of regress of rules, or the notion of rule following is reduced to an idle label. We conclude by suggesting that our arguments do not support naturalism: It is a mistake to assume that normativism and naturalism are our only options. Not long ago, 'meaning is normative' was the battle cry of the day. This was largely the result of the enthusiastic reception of Saul Kripke's book on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. There, Kripke argued that meaning is normative in the sense that it essentially involves certain 'oughts'. A candidate for what constitutes the state of my meaning something by a sign, Kripke argued, has to be such that "whatever in fact I (am disposed to) do, there is a unique thing that I should do." 1 This claim struck many people not only as true but also as teaching us something profoundly important about the nature of linguistic meaning. It was suggested that theories of meaning that do not allow for any genuine

To determine whether simple measurements made on conventional radiographs of the hip could predict hip fractures, we obtained pelvic radiographs on 9704 white women age 65 or older. We analyze the radiographs of all 162 women who subsequently suffered a hip fracture and 162 randomly selected women who did not. Adjusting for age, four measurements independently predicted hip fractures: reduced thickness of the femoral shaft cortex (odds ratio 1.7 per standard deviation; 95% confidence interval 1.2, 2.3) and of the femoral neck cortex (1.4 per standard deviation; 1.0, 1.9), reduction in an index of tensile trabeculae (2.0 per unit; 1.4, 2.9), and wider trochanteric region (1.4 per standard deviation; 1.0, 2.0). The combination of these four measurements predicted hip fracture at least as strongly as did measurement of bone density of the femoral neck (areas of the receiver-operating characteristic curve = 0.81 and 0.80, respectively). We conclude that simple measurements made on pelvic radiographs predict hip fractures as well as bone density of the hip.

Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.According to an account currently very popular in the philosophical literature, perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and distinctive phenomenal character. If we accept such an account, we should be able to provide answers to the following two questions: First, the 'state question': What kind of a mental state is experience? And second, the 'content question': What form does its content take?Both of these questions, it seems to me, have been somewhat neglected in recent debates. These debates have focused instead on the relation between phenomenal character and representational content, and the kind of content experiences have. Thus, we have seen the 'qualia-wars' and the search for a viable notion of nonconceptual content. These clearly are intriguing issues, but they have diverted attention from the more fundamental concerns mentioned above. The question I shall be most concerned with in this paper is the state question: What kind of mental state is experience? However, as we shall see, answering this question directly implicates the content question, the question what form the content of experience takes.

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