Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions

Using Incentives to Obtain Truthful Information

“…Thus, for a population of agents with the same knowledge, reporting truthfully is a Nash equilibrium. This is called the peer prediction method in ([Miller et al, 2005]). …”

“…Recently, [Lambert and Shoham, 2009] have characterized the questions to which truthful answers can be elicited using scoring rules.…”

Power Diagram Detection with Applications to Information Elicitation

“…One of the most basic information elicitation tasks is to design a contract to elicit some function, or property, of an agent's belief. The literature dates back to Savage [27] and Osband [23], with its modern incarnation beginning with Lambert et al [20,21]. Concretely, consider a finite set of outcomes O, the set of probability distributions ∆(O), a finite set of possible reports R, and a property Γ : ∆(O) → 2 R which designates a set of reports considered "correct" or "desired" for an agent with a particular belief.…”

“…A natural question is thus the following: for which properties Γ can one devise a score which elicits it? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is simple: the elicitable properties Γ are precisely those for which the partition P = (P r ) r∈R given by P r = {p : r ∈ Γ (p)} forms a power diagram [17,21]. More precisely, after projecting to R |O|−1 , e.g.…”

Eliciting truthful measurements from a community of sensors

“…It is also possible to use scoring rules to elicit averages, maxima and other functions of a set of measurements, see [5] for a complete characterization of the possibilities offered by scoring rules. However, in pollution sensing, it is generally not possible to ever know the ground truth as required by scoring rule.…”