Elite-level issue dynamics

Lee, Daniel J; Schutte, Rachel A.

doi:10.1177/1354068815588258

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…American society is also culturally polarized along political lines [34]. Partisan issues include immigration, abortion and gun control [33,71] and Americans are aware of the partisanism, which can make them even more partisan [103].…”

Section: Polarization In the Unitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Re)Design to Mitigate Political Polarization

Nelimarkka

Rancy

Grygiel

et al. 2019

Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact.

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Social Media platforms are increasingly being used for political activities and communication, and research suggests that social media design and use is contributing to the polarization of the public sphere. This study draws on Habermas' ideals concerning deliberative democracy to explore if novel interface designs that diversify information sources through content recommendation, can decrease polarization. Through a designprobe interview approach and insights generated from 19 political and citizen experts in Finland and the United States, we found that our deliberative design can lead to depolarization, while creating additional complexity through which users question content and information. We discuss the need to move beyond naive content recommendation, and user interface level changes, in order to work towards a depolarized public sphere.CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Collaborative and social computing; Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing; Interaction design process and methods; • Applied computing → Law, social and behavioral sciences;

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Section: Polarization In the Unitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Re)Design to Mitigate Political Polarization

Nelimarkka

Rancy

Grygiel

et al. 2019

Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Even the meaning of left-right itself shows a lot of variation across systems (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Rovny and Edwards, 2012). A rich literature shows the prominent, and proactive, role of parties and their competing with each other in establishing dimensions of the political space (Riker, 1982; Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Elias et al, 2015; Lee and Schutte, 2017). Specifically, parties strategically choose to emphasize or to remain silent on certain issues (Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1983).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Party competition and the structuring of party preferences by the left-right dimension

Reinermann

2022

Rationality and Society

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There is a wide selection of theoretical approaches to explain preferences citizens have for political parties, among them the spatial model of party competition in which voters choose based on proximity in a policy space, such as the left-right dimension. However, it has not ultimately prevailed against its competitors. Thus, a literature has emerged that allows for heterogeneity, asking whose preferences follow this logic and whose do not. However, research on how context affects spatial structuring is still sparse. Therefore, I combine CSES survey data with manifesto data in a sample of established democracies to examine the effects of party competition structure, measured by the “effective” number of parties and the polarization and dimensionality of party positions, on left-right structuration of party preferences in a single model. While I do not find significant context effects with a conventional measure of proximity voting, I propose a different operationalization which shows that while there are systematic effects of the party system, party preferences are mostly quite strongly structured by the left–right dimension.

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Multiple Ideal Points: Revealed Preferences in Different Domains

Moser¹,

Rodríguez²,

Lofland³

2021

Polit. Anal.

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We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains—for example, when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result, we are able to directly compare a member’s revealed preferences across different domains of voting (different sets of motions) to assess if, for example, a member votes more conservatively on agriculture motions than on defense. In doing so, we are able to assess the extent to which voting behavior of an individual voter is consistent with a uni-dimensional spatial model—if a member has the same preferences in all domains. The key novelty is to estimate rather than assume the identity of “stayers”—voters whose revealed preference is constant across votes. Our approach offers methodology for investigating the relationship between the basic space and issue space in legislative voting (Poole 2007). There are several methodological advantages to our approach. First, our model allows for testing sharp hypotheses. Second, the methodology developed can be understood as a kind of partial-pooling model for item response theory scaling, resulting in less uncertainty of estimates. Related, our estimation method provides a principled and unified approach to the issue of “granularity” (i.e., the level of aggregation) in the analysis of roll-call data (Crespin and Rohde 2010; Roberts et al. 2016). We illustrate the model by estimating U.S. House of Representatives members’ revealed preferences in different policy domains, and identify several other potential applications of the model including: studying the relationship between committee and floor voting behavior; and investigating constituency influence and representation.

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Elite-level issue dynamics

Cited by 5 publications

References 27 publications

(Re)Design to Mitigate Political Polarization

(Re)Design to Mitigate Political Polarization

Party competition and the structuring of party preferences by the left-right dimension

Multiple Ideal Points: Revealed Preferences in Different Domains

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