EM Injection: Fault Model and Locality

Ordas, Sébastien; Guillaume-Sage, Ludovic; Maurine, Philippe

doi:10.1109/fdtc.2015.9

Cited by 35 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…This means that EMPI is able to induce bitsets and bitresets. In 2015, Ordas et al, have finally introduced and experimentally demonstrated in [15] the correctness of a new fault model for EMPI. This model is called the sampling fault model.…”

Section: A State Of the Art On Em Injectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to this model, EMPI is able to modify significantly but temporarily the bias of any interconnect within an IC. Considering this, and the fact that the DFFs are the only CMOS gates that must meet some operating constraints, they assumed in [15] that DFFs are the main front door to inject faults within IC using EMPI. More precisely, the sampling fault model states that the EM susceptibility of DFFs is higher than any other type of CMOS gates and that its value is:…”

Section: A State Of the Art On Em Injectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Fully-Digital EM Pulse Detector

El-Baze

Rigaud

Maurine

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 Design, Automation &Amp; Test in Europe Conference &Amp; Exhibition (DATE)

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ElectroMagnetic Pulse Injection (EMPI) has recently been demonstrated to be an efficient fault injection technique with many advantages especially when considering security issues of Systems on Chip (SoC) embedded on ball grid array packages, i.e. when adversaries do not have an easy access to the backside. EMPI must therefore be considered as a real threat against smartcards and SoC from now on. Among the usual countermeasures against fault attacks, one can identify the use of embedded sensors. If one can find voltage glitch or laser shot detectors in the literature, there is only one proposal which puts forward the idea of detecting ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP). However, this former sensor requires a fine tuning of some timing characteristics and, as a result, its use appears complex and even impractical within a SoC which are heterogeneous by nature and designed by worldwide teams. Within this context, this paper introduces and experimentally validates a new sensor allowing to detect EMP. Because the sensor is fully digital, it is low cost and above all fully compliant with the standard design flow of SoC.

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Section: A State Of the Art On Em Injectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A State Of the Art On Em Injectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fully-Digital EM Pulse Detector

El-Baze

Rigaud

Maurine

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 Design, Automation &Amp; Test in Europe Conference &Amp; Exhibition (DATE)

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Despite the growing interest of the fault attack community for the electromagnetic side-channel, a consistent decription of the physical fault mechanism remains out of reach. However, previous work highlighted the interactions between an injection probe and the clock tree [3], reset line [4] and power-ground network of a device [5]. These concurrent phenomenons partially explain the plethora of fault models reported in the litterature on electromagnetic pulse injection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers

Bhasin

Dutertre

et al. 2019

2019 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)

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Fault injection techniques allow an attacker to alter the behavior of an electronic device in order to extract confidential information or be granted unauthorized privileges. To this end, local electromagnetic fault injections (EMFI) are commonly used to corrupt or prevent the execution of instructions. However, little attention is devoted to practical data corruption. This article investigates the local effects of EMFI on data transfer from the Flash memory to the 128-bit data buffer of a cortex-M microcontroller. We demonstrate that the corrupted bits are closely related to the location of the injection probe, allowing us to set or reset from 0 to 128 bits with a bytelevel precision. Moreover, the spatial and temporal accuracy of the injection technique allowed us to target the data prefetch mechanism without corrupting the code execution. We highlight the efficiency of the derived fault model with three practical case studies. Firstly, we demonstrate precise keyzeroing and key-setting capability, with further extension to a DFA on the secret key of a cipher from Biham and Shamir, that was never implemented practically. Next, we report practical persistent faults on ARM microcontroller, which allows an attacker to retrieve the secret key of a cipher with a single successful injection.

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“…However, the manufacturing cost of the electromagnetic fault injection probe is lower. Dehbaoui et al [7] and S. Ordas et al [8] designed electromagnetic probes and used electromagnetic attacks to implement bit set or bit reset of data in the chip. Accurately injecting the fault into the encryption device is a prerequisite for obtaining the secret key.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the attackers can use less sophisticated electromagnetic fault injection to attack sensors in IoT. An electromagnetic fault attack firstly introduces a transient fault [7,8] to the working chip by an electromagnetic probe. The correct key is obtained by collecting and analyzing the relationship between the fault and the correct data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Effective Simulation Analysis of Transient Electromagnetic Multiple Faults

Liang

Sun

Zhu

et al. 2020

Sensors

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Embedded encryption devices and smart sensors are vulnerable to physical attacks. Due to the continuous shrinking of chip size, laser injection, particle radiation and electromagnetic transient injection are possible methods that introduce transient multiple faults. In the fault analysis stage, the adversary is unclear about the actual number of faults injected. Typically, the single-nibble fault analysis encounters difficulties. Therefore, in this paper, we propose novel ciphertext-only impossible differentials that can analyze the number of random faults to six nibbles. We use the impossible differentials to exclude the secret key that definitely does not exist, and then gradually obtain the unique secret key through inverse difference equations. Using software simulation, we conducted 32,000 random multiple fault attacks on Midori. The experiments were carried out to verify the theoretical model of multiple fault attacks. We obtain the relationship between fault injection and information content. To reduce the number of fault attacks, we further optimized the fault attack method. The secret key can be obtained at least 11 times. The proposed ciphertext-only impossible differential analysis provides an effective method for random multiple faults analysis, which would be helpful for improving the security of block ciphers.

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EM Injection: Fault Model and Locality

Cited by 35 publications

References 8 publications

A Fully-Digital EM Pulse Detector

A Fully-Digital EM Pulse Detector

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers

An Effective Simulation Analysis of Transient Electromagnetic Multiple Faults

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