Embodied Selves and Divided Minds

Maiese, Michelle

doi:10.1093/med/9780199689231.001.0001

Cited by 58 publications

(75 citation statements)

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“…Instead, depressed patients say things like, "There is only emptiness around me; it fills the space between me and my husband… I am kept away from the whole world" (quoted in Fuchs 2013, p. 229). We find similar reports in schizophrenic patients (Maiese 2015;Van Duppen 2017).…”

Section: Affective Affordances and Psychopathology: Two Case Studiessupporting

confidence: 92%

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Affective affordances and psychopathology

Krueger¹,

Colombetti²

2018

Philosophical Perspectives on Affective Experience and Psychopathology

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Affective affordances and psychopathology Self-disorders in depression and schizophrenia have been the focus of much recent work in phenomenological psychopathology. But little has been said about the role the material environment plays in shaping the affective character of these disorders. In this paper, we argue that enjoying reliable (i.e., trustworthy) access to the things and spaces around us-the constituents of our material environment-is crucial for our ability to stabilize and regulate our affective life on a day-today basis. These things and spaces often play an ineliminable role in shaping what we feel and how we feel it; when we interact with them, they contribute ongoing feedback that "scaffolds" the character and temporal development of our affective experiences. However, in some psychopathological conditions, the ability to access these things and spaces becomes disturbed. Individuals not only lose certain forms of access to the practical significance of the built environment but also to its regulative significance, too-and the stability and organization of their affective life is compromised. In developing this view, we discuss core concepts like "affordance spaces", "scaffolding", and "incorporation". We apply these concepts to two case studies, severe depression and schizophrenia, and we show why these cases support our main claim. We conclude by briefly considering implications of this view for developing intervention and treatment strategies.

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Section: Affective Affordances and Psychopathology: Two Case Studiessupporting

confidence: 92%

“…In this vein, Maiese (2015) has recently argued for the need to explore "bottom-up treatment methods", as she terms them. These methods, which address the dynamics of bodily movements and affect, consist of therapeutic methods like yoga, music, and dance/movement therapies.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective affordances and psychopathology

Krueger¹,

Colombetti²

2018

Philosophical Perspectives on Affective Experience and Psychopathology

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“…This confirms the centrality of interaction's role in intersubjectivity, and moreover, that it is possible to investigate this in bodily and experiential ways, which can generate novel insights. The findings we present here are in line with research supporting the use of body therapies in the treatment of various psychiatric disorders, for instance schizophrenia and autism (Behrends et al 2012;Galbusera and Fuchs 2014;Maiese 2016;Martin et al 2016). PRISMA can be used to help further refine ways to test and improve such ideas.…”

supporting

confidence: 84%

Grasping intersubjectivity: an invitation to embody social interaction research

Jaegher

Pieper²,

Clénin

et al. 2016

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Underlying the recent focus on embodied and interactive aspects of social understanding are several intuitions about what roles the body, interaction processes, and interpersonal experience play. In this paper, we introduce a systematic, hands-on method for investigating the experience of interacting and its role in intersubjectivity. Special about this method is that it starts from the idea that researchers of social understanding are themselves one of the best tools for their own investigations. The method provides ways for researchers to calibrate and to trust themselves as sophisticated instruments to help generate novel insights into human interactive experience. We present the basics of the method, and two empirical studies. The first is a videostudy on autism, which shows greater refinement in the way people with autism embody their social interactions than previously thought. The second is a study of thinking in live interactions, which provides insight into the common feeling that too much thinking can hamper interaction, and into how this kind of interactional awkwardness might be unblocked.

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“…An increasing body of literature from recent years is providing a renewed understanding of schizophrenia from this perspective (Bürgy, 2008; Fuchs, 2010; Sass et al, 2011; Henriksen and Parnas, 2012; Parnas, 2012; Akroyd, 2013; Nelson et al, 2014; Parnas and Henriksen, 2014; Sass, 2014; Fielding-Smith et al, 2015; Irarrázaval, 2015; Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2015; Maiese, 2016; Stanghellini and Aragona, 2016). A model of schizophrenia as an ipseity-disturbance has arisen.…”

Section: Schizophrenia As a Disorder Of Ipseitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This reorientation of self-experiences toward values begins with the identification and clarification of one's own values. From the phenomenological point of view, the reorientation of life to values, rather than to self-experiences, may serve to reduce the hyper-reflexivity and intensified self-awareness that characterize schizophrenia (Pérez-Álvarez et al, 2011; Fuller, 2013; Maiese, 2016). …”

Section: A New Lease Of Life For the Psychotherapy Of Schizophreniamentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Schizophrenia in the Context of the Person and Their Circumstances: Seven Reasons

et al. 2016

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We know a great deal about schizophrenia, but the current state of the art is one of uncertainty. Researchers are confused, and patients feel misunderstood. This situation has been identified as due largely to the fact that the dominant neurobiological perspective leaves out the person. The aim of the present article is to review and integrate a series of clinical, phenomenological, historical, cultural, epidemiological, developmental, epigenetic, and therapeutic phenomena in support of a suggestion that schizophrenia is above all a disorder of the person rather than of the brain. Specifically, we review seven phenomena, beginning with the conception of schizophrenia as a particular disorder of the self. We continue by looking at its recent origin, as a modern phenomenon, its juvenile onset, related to the formation of the self, the better prognosis in developing countries compared to developed countries, and the high incidence of the disorder among migrants. In the context of these phenomena of a marked socio-cultural nature, we consider the so-called “genetic myth,” according to which schizophrenia would have a genetic origin. On reviewing the current genetic emphasis in the light of epigenetics, it emerges that the environment and behavior recover their prominent role in the vicissitudes of development. The seventh reason, which closes the circle of the argument, concerns the role of interpersonal “chemistry” in recovery of the sense of self.

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Embodied Selves and Divided Minds

Cited by 58 publications

References 0 publications

Affective affordances and psychopathology

Affective affordances and psychopathology

Grasping intersubjectivity: an invitation to embody social interaction research

Rethinking Schizophrenia in the Context of the Person and Their Circumstances: Seven Reasons

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