Embodiment, ownership and disownership

Vignemont, Frédérique de

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004

Cited by 357 publications

(297 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Despite the interesting results from bodily illusion paradigms in healthy individuals, it is unquestionable that the sense of limb ownership disrupted by brain-damage is incomparably more disturbed. While in healthy subjects artificial embodiment sensation for external objects is more variable (de Vignemont, 2011), body disownership in patients appears to be more constant.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Our hypothesis was that persons with amputation desire should show a similar responses to those described for patients with somatoparaphrenia, as both conditions feature an underrepresentation of a body part (Berti, 2013), and, more specifically, a compromised feeling of ownership (de Vignemont, 2011). However a critical difference between somatoparaphrenia and amputation desire is that amputation desire lack the feeling of ownership but not the judgment, while somatoparaphrenia, lack both the ownership feeling and the ownership judgment, thus our results contribute suggesting which level of body awareness is necessary for pain anticipation: the primitive level of the feeling, or at the more cognitive level of the judgment.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The primary feeling of ownership has been defined as primitive, exclusive sensation for biological body parts on which typically are based the judgments of ownership (de Vignemont, 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is the gap between this conscious, reflective judgement and the overwhelming feeling of extraneousness towards it that elicits a desire of amputation, which is experienced as irrational, even for the person with this condition. Following de Vignemont's taxonomy (de Vignemont, 2011), in persons with amputation desire the judgment of ownership is still preserved although the feeling of possession of the unwanted limb has gone, while somatoparaphrenic patients have lost both, feeling and judgment of ownership. Our findings support the idea that the feeling of ownership plays a pivotal role in anticipating incoming sensory stimuli suggesting that the emotional component of nociception is critical in this adaptive behaviour.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Body ownership: When feeling and knowing diverge

Romano

Sedda

Brugger

et al. 2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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Individuals with the peculiar disturbance of 'overcompleteness' experience an intense desire to amputate one of their healthy limbs, describing a sense of disownership for it (Body Integrity Identity Disorder -BIID). This condition is similar to somatoparaphrenia, the acquired delusion that one's own limb belongs to someone else. In ten individuals with BIID, we measured skin conductance response to noxious stimuli, delivered to the accepted and non-accepted limb, touching the body part or simulating the contact (stimuli approach the body without contacting it), hypothesizing that these individuals have responses like somatoparaphrenic patients, who previously showed reduced pain anticipation, when the threat was directed to the disowned limb. We found reduced anticipatory response to stimuli approaching, but not contacting, the unwanted limb. Conversely, stimuli contacting the non-accepted body-part, induced stronger SCR than those contacting the healthy parts, suggesting that feeling of ownership is critically related to a proper processing of incoming threats. AbstractPersons with peculiar disturbance of 'overcompleteness' experience an intense desire to amputate

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The primary feeling of ownership has been defined as primitive, exclusive sensation for biological body parts on which typically are based the judgments of ownership (de Vignemont, 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Body ownership: When feeling and knowing diverge

Romano

Sedda

Brugger

et al. 2015

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…Ownership for one's hand has been proposed to constitute a crucial aspect of bodily selfconsciousness (De Vignemont, 2011;Gallagher, 2000;Makin et al, 2008;Tsakiris, 2010) and an increasing number of empirical data on the neural underpinnings of body ownership have pointed to the importance of multisensory integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals (Botvinick, 2004;Botvinick and Cohen, 1998;Ehrsson et al, 2005;Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). A widely used paradigm to study the multisensory perception of upper limbs is the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) where participants watch an artificial hand (visual cue) being stroked by a paintbrush in synchrony with stroking on their own corresponding and occluded hand (tactile cue).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared electrophysiology mechanisms of body ownership and motor imagery

Evans

Blanke

2013

NeuroImage

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Although we feel, see, and experience our hands as our own (body or hand ownership), recent research has shown that illusory hand ownership can be induced for fake or virtual hands and may be useful for neuroprosthetics and brain-computer interfaces. Despite the vast amount of behavioral data on illusory hand ownership, neuroimaging studies are rare, in particular electrophysiological studies. Thus, while the neural systems underlying hand ownership are relatively well described, the spectral signatures of body ownership as measured by electroencephalography (EEG) remain elusive. Here we induced illusory hand ownership in an automated, computer-controlled manner using virtual reality while recording 64-channel EEG and found that illusory hand ownership is reflected by a body-specific modulation in the mu-band over fronto-parietal cortex. In a second experiment in the same subjects, we then show that mu as well as beta-band activity in highly similar fronto-parietal regions was also modulated during a motor imagery task often used in paradigms employing non-invasive brain-computer interface technology. These data provide insights into the electrophysiological brain mechanisms of illusory hand ownership and their strongly overlapping mechanisms with motor imagery in fronto-parietal cortex. They also highlight the potential of combining high-resolution EEG with virtual reality setups and automatized stimulation protocols for systematic, reproducible stimulus presentation in cognitive neuroscience, and may inform the design of non-invasive brain-computer interfaces.

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