Emergence of cooperative linkages by random intensity of selection on a network

Ichinose, Genki; Kobayashi, Mio

doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.02.004

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Nowak and May were the first to reveal that spatial structure provides a viable mechanism for cooperation to evolve [18]. Recently, spatial structures have been mapped to suitable network topologies and the evolution of cooperation has been investigated through the analysis of PD played on those network topologies [1,2,9,10,13,14,19,24]. In this context, the effect of spatial structures required for the emergence of cooperation is referred to as network reciprocity, which has come to be recognized as one of the enabling mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation as well as the other ones [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated vs. Average Payoffs

Ichinose¹,

Sayama²

2014

Artificial Life 14: Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems

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It is well known that cooperation cannot be an evolutionary stable strategy for a non-iterative game in a well-mixed population. In contrast, structured populations favor cooperation since cooperators can benefit each other by forming local clusters. Previous studies have shown that scale-free networks strongly promote cooperation. However, little is known about the invasion mechanism of cooperation in scalefree networks. To study microscopic and macroscopic behaviors of cooperators' invasion, we conducted computational experiments of the evolution of cooperation in scale-free networks where, starting from all defectors, cooperators can spontaneously emerge by mutation. Since the evolutionary dynamics are influenced by the definition of fitness, we tested two commonly adopted fitness functions: accumulated payoff and average payoff. Simulation results show that cooperation is strongly enhanced with the accumulated payoff fitness compared to the average payoff fitness. However, the difference between the two functions decreases as the average degree increases. As the average degree increases, cooperation decreases with the accumulated payoff fitness, while it increases with the average payoff fitness. Moreover, with the average payoff fitness, low-degree nodes play a more important role in spreading cooperative strategies compared to the case of the accumulated payoff fitness.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated vs. Average Payoffs

Ichinose¹,

Sayama²

2014

Artificial Life 14: Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems

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“…Nowak and May revealed that spatial structures are required for the evolution of cooperation [2]. Recently, it has been possible to map any given spatial structure on a suitable network topology and the evolution of cooperation has been investigated through the analysis of PD played on the corresponding complex network [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of cooperation on scale-free networks under continuous topological change

2013

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In this paper, we numerically investigate the robustness of cooperation clusters in prisoner's dilemma played on scale-free networks, where the network topologies change by continuous removal and addition of nodes. Each removal and addition can be either random or intentional. We therefore have four different strategies in changing network topology: random removal and random addition (RR), random removal and preferential addition (RP), targeted removal and random addition (TR), and targeted removal and preferential addition (TP). We find that cooperation clusters are most fragile against TR, while they are most robust against RP, even for large values of the temptation coefficient for defection. The effect of the degree mixing pattern of the network is not the primary factor for the robustness of cooperation under continuous change in network topology, which is quite different from the cases observed in static networks. Cooperation clusters become more robust as the number of links of hubs occupied by cooperators increase. Our results might infer the fact that a huge variety of individuals is needed for maintaining global cooperation in social networks in the real world where each node representing an individual is constantly removed and added.

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Radiation-Induced Bystander Effects and Stress-Induced Mutagenesis

Mothersill

Seymour

2013

Stress-Induced Mutagenesis

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Emergence of cooperative linkages by random intensity of selection on a network

Cited by 6 publications

References 38 publications

Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated vs. Average Payoffs

Invasion of Cooperation in Scale-Free Networks: Accumulated vs. Average Payoffs

Robustness of cooperation on scale-free networks under continuous topological change

Radiation-Induced Bystander Effects and Stress-Induced Mutagenesis

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