Emission reduction technology sharing with environmental tax under multiple oligopolies

Chen, Junlong; Sun, Chaoqun; Shen, Yiyi; Liu, Jiali

doi:10.1007/s10668-022-02782-w

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 42 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The cost function of Firm 2 is

c_{2} = \frac{{θ_{2}}^{2}}{2} + m e_{2}

, where

θ_{i}

is the emission‐reduction amount and

m

is the carbon tax. The profit function is

π_{i} = p_{i} q_{i} - c_{i}

, the carbon emission is

e_{i} = q_{i} - θ_{i}

(Coria, 2009; Xu et al, 2016), and the environmental damage is

italicDE = \frac{{((), \sum_{i = 1}^{2} e_{i})}^{2}}{2}

(Chen et al, 2022). The consumer surplus is

italicCS = \frac{{((), \sum_{i = 1}^{2} q_{i})}^{2}}{2}

(Yan & Yang, 2018), and the social welfare is

italicSW = \sum_{i = 1}^{2} π_{i} + italicCS - italicDE

.…”

Section: Model Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral cross‐ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing in a duopoly

Chen,

Sun,

Liu

2023

Manage Decis Econ

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study constructs a Cournot duopoly model that considers unilateral cross‐ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing, compares the equilibrium results under different cases, explores the impacts of unilateral cross‐ownership and technology sharing, and analyzes the boundary conditions for realizing technology sharing. The results indicate that unilateral cross‐ownership has complex effects on the equilibrium results. Emission‐reduction technology plays a positive role in improving environmental and social welfare. Furthermore, the boundary conditions of technology sharing were found to be affected by the carbon tax, cost‐reduction effect of emission‐reduction technology, and cross‐ownership.

show abstract

“…The cost function of Firm 2 is