Emotional transfer in goal systems

Fishbach, Ayelet; Shah, James Y.; Kruglanski, Arie W.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2004.04.001

Cited by 180 publications

(195 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…The present data are consistent with these findings. Thus, our results support the structural analysis of motivation, according to which intrinsic motivation emerges when the means-goal association is unique; that is, the means serves only one goal, and the goal is attained via a single means (Fishbach et al, 2004;Kruglanski et al, 2002). By adding and then removing alternative goals, that is, external rewards for performing an activity that also serves a goal of self-expression (e.g., writing, drawing, problem solving), the motivation for pursuing the activity decreases because it is no longer associated with the original goal to the same extent.…”

Section: Implications For Research On Motivationsupporting

confidence: 80%

The dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path.

Zhang¹,

Fishbach²,

Kruglanski³

2007

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Six experiments tested a dilution model of self-regulation, whereby increasing the number of goals (e.g., building muscles and losing weight) that a single means (e.g., exercising) can satisfy reduces the perception of its instrumentality with respect to each goal. The authors found that an increase in the number of simultaneous, salient goals that can be satisfied via a single means weakens the associative strength between that means and each individual goal, and as a result, individuals perceive the means as less effective for the attainment of each goal. Consequently, means that are connected to multiple (vs. single) goals are less likely to be chosen and pursued when only one of these goals is activated.

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Section: Implications For Research On Motivationsupporting

confidence: 80%

The dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path.

Zhang¹,

Fishbach²,

Kruglanski³

2007

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Self Cite

146

231

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“…The likelihood of goal-congruent choice can be increased by bolstering the value of goals or by devaluing temptations. People may bolster the value of high-order goals by linking the attainment of these goals to their selfstandards (Bandura, 1989) or by elaborating on what makes them important Fishbach, Shah, & Kruglanski, 2004;Kuhl, 1984). They may further devalue temptations by disassociating these motives from the self, or ignoring aspects that make temptations important.…”

Section: Changing the Psychological Meaning Of Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Walking the Line between Goals and Temptations: Asymmetric Effects of Counteractive Control

Fishbach¹,

Converse²

2010

Self Control in Society, Mind, and Brain

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A chapter to appear in "self control in brain mind and society", R. R., Hassin, Y. Trope, & K.Ochsner (Eds.), Oxford University Press. 2People rarely desire one thing at a time. Rather, the process of goal pursuit involves constantly prioritizing the many goals that a person wishes to pursue and resolving goal conflicts (e.g., navigating career, leisure, and family activities). In this chapter we focus on a specific type of goal conflict: the self-control dilemma. People face a self-control dilemma whenever the attainment of a high-order goal would come at the expense of a low-order, yet alluring temptation (Ainslie, 1992;Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994;Loewenstein, 1996;Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;Rachlin, 2000;Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). For example, a dieter's desire to finish a meal with a sweet dessert may not coincide with his desire to maintain a low-fat diet; a saver's wish to get the new gadget in stores may interfere with her saving plans; and a student's urge to procrastinate may not allow him to complete his assignments on time. Whenever these individuals contemplate the conflicting motives (i.e., goal vs. temptation), they experience a selfcontrol dilemma. In response to self-control dilemmas, people exercise self control to facilitate the attainment of the more important goal (Ainslie, 2001;Baumeister & Vohs, 2004;Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996;Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989;Rachlin, 2000).Goals and temptations are both motivational states but they have different status. Highorder motives (or "goals") serve central interests that are more important in the long-run, and low-order motives (or "temptations") serve peripheral interests that are beneficial in the shortterm. In this view, self-control is a tool for pursuing goals that are given high priority in a person's subjective goal hierarchy. Thus, the processes of goal setting (determining the goal hierarchy) do not require self control. In addition, self control is rarely a goal in itself, in the sense that people do not have a goal to exercise self control. Instead, self control is an 3 instrumental response that improves goal striving when high-order goals are in conflict with loworder temptations.Self-control problems are common and have a long history in human conduct and thought. Self-control problems have been documented and studied in philosophy, religion, and more recently in the social sciences, by researchers in economics (e.g., Becker, 1960;O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2000;Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), political science (e.g., Elster, 1977;Schelling, 1984), and psychology (e.g., Ainslie, 2001;Baumeister & Vohs, 2004;Rachlin, 2000). In light of this rich history and the various perspectives presented in this volume, the purpose of the current chapter is to shed light on the processes of self control from a structural point of view, proposed by counteractive control theory (Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Fishbach & Trope, 2007;Trope & Fishbach, 2000.Counteractive control theory addresses the process by which people proactively counteract the threat that tem...

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“…There is also sufficient evidence for more positive implicit evaluations of means associated with the active goal (cf. Fishbach, Shah & Kruglanski, 2004;Ferguson, 2008;Kolańczyk, 2008). Crucially, once a goal is achieved, both the goal itself and the means are neutralized (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).…”

Section: The Role Of Positive Affect In Maintaining Goals (Ef1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

When Affect Supports Cognitive Control – A Working Memory Perspective

Kolańczyk

2016

Polish Psychological Bulletin

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attention (EF1), whereas negative affect activates the inhibition of non-functional contents, e.g., distractors and irrelevant objects (resulting in attention disengagement; EF2). Adaptation to conflict proceeds via sequential triggering of negative and positive affect (EF3). Moreover, it was demonstrated that the focus on action orreflection changes the scope of contents subjected to implicit (affective) control. Therefore, I suggest that the motivational system, to a large extent, plays the role of the Central Executive. The paper opens a discussion and proposes studies on affective mechanisms of cognitive control.

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Emotional transfer in goal systems

Cited by 180 publications

References 36 publications

The dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path.

The dilution model: How additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path.

Walking the Line between Goals and Temptations: Asymmetric Effects of Counteractive Control

When Affect Supports Cognitive Control – A Working Memory Perspective

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