Emotions and the extended mind

Slaby, Jan

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0003

Cited by 100 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 35 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…does so. The literature on ExM has also been concerned primarily with cognition (see, e.g., Clark, 2008;Rowlands, 2008;Menary, 2010b), with some recent exceptions (Stephan et al, 2013;Colombetti & Roberts, 2014;Krueger 2014;Slaby 2014). …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

230

184

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the "extended-mind" view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Sterelny's Scaffolded MindSterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This term refers to the idea that the mind is "environmentally supported," more specifically that 2 cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the organism's chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn affects the beaver's behavior and that of its progeny.Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what Sterenly calls "intergenerational social learning"; see also Sterelny, 2012).Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, b...

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

230

184

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…While Krueger considers how emotions might be extended in the stronger sense we defend (what Krueger calls the hypothesis of individually extended emotions) Krueger does not go so far as to defend the view. Slaby (2014) by contrast does defend such a position, though, only in the context where it is EMT (rather than HEC) that must be granted in the background. Given that HEC is easier to motivate than EMT, our proposal demonstrates a simpler way to the conclusion, and further, unlike Slaby's proposal, does not rely on a further need to motivate 'phenomenal coupling'.…”

Section: Cognitivist Accounts Of Emotionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Extended emotion

Carter¹,

Gordon

Palermos

2015

Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g. Clark 2011; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2000Wilson , 2004Menary 2006) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas, and in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: i.e., the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.

show abstract

“…The various tools and technologies we use to support these processes play such a crucial role in "scaffolding" (i.e., setting up, driving, and regulating) them, we ought to view these external resources as part of the cognitive process itself (Clark 2008) -or at least as contributing environmental support essential for maintaining the character and functional integrity of the process in question (Sterelny 2010). 2 A prominent trend in recent externalist debates considers the possibility that affective states like moods and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Carter et al 2016;Colombetti and Roberts 2015;Greenwood 2013;Krueger 2014b;Krueger and Szanto 2016;Slaby 2014;Stephan et al 2014). Call this the scaffolded affectivity thesis (SA).…”

Section: Externalising Affectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When I am drawn into the exuberance of a lively party, say, or swept along by the collective rage of a political protest or the euphoria of a live concert with thousands of people, the expressions of others literally take hold of my body and pull responsive movements and affective responses out of me that diachronically integrate with those of the crowd (Chartrand and Bargh 1999;Slaby 2014). This process "creates a circular interplay of expressions and reactions running in split seconds and constantly modifying each partner's bodily state, in a process that becomes highly autonomous and is not directly controlled by the partners" (Froese and Fuchs 2012, p. 213).…”

Section: Social Scaffoldingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self

Krueger

2018

Topoi

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically "scaffolded" by external (i.e., beyond-the-brain) resources. I consider how these "scaffolded" approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of "affective scaffolding" and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue-along with others in phenomenological psychopathology-that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia is not simply a disruption of ipseity or minimal self-consciousness but rather a disruption of the scaffolded self, established and regulated via its ongoing engagement with the world and others. I conclude by considering how this scaffolded framework indicates the need to consider new forms of intervention and treatment.

show abstract

Emotions and the extended mind

Cited by 100 publications

References 35 publications

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Extended emotion

Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About