Empirical research into the problem of other minds: How developmental social psychology can strengthen the Wittgensteinian attitudinal approach

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to examine the Wittgensteinian attitudinal approach to the problem of other minds initially proposed by M.R.M. ter Hark (1991) and developed by Hyslop (1995 Even though it might appear that the problem of other minds raises the question about the nature of our psychosocial strategies for making sense of other people, their thoughts, feelings, and actions, this is not its focal point. 1Ovaj članak nastao je u okviru projekta"Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu: filozofski i empirijski aspekti" (evidencioni broj 179041), koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

Religious hinge commitments: Developing Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism

“…A child's knowledge of others we form beliefs (propositional attitudes) about particular people. Radenovic (2014) argues that such a distinction, between the intuitive general attitude toward other people and particular beliefs about their mental states, seems to be needed to make sense of what we know about the development of social cognition and language.…”